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UNEQUAL JUSTICE: ARABS IN AMERICA
AND UNITED STATES ANTITERRORISM
LEGISLATION
Michael J. Whidden*
Racial discrimination in any form and in any degree has no
justifiable part whatever in our democratic way of life. It is
unattractive in any setting but it is utterly revolting among a free
people who have embraced the principles set forth in the
Constitution of the United States. All residents of this nation are
kin in some way by blood or culture to a foreign land. Yet they are
primarily and necessarily a part of the new and distinct civilization
of the United States. They must accordingly be treated at all times
as the heirs of the American experiment and as entitled to all the
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution.
1
INTRODUCTION
In 1995, 168 people were killed and 850 others were injured when
the Alfred P. Murrah Building in Oklahoma City was bombed.2 It was
"the worst terrorist attack and the most egregious mass murder in
American history."3 Two Americans, Timothy McVeigh and Terry
Nichols, were charged with and convicted of the crime. To "ensure
that there [was] never another Oklahoma City,"' legislators
responded by passing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
* I would like to thank my wife Christie, who provided me with constant
encouragement, interest, and advice, as well as the many others-too numerous to
adequately thank here-who assisted in the production of this Note.
1. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,242 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
2. The FBI: A Comprehensive Reference Guide 95 (Athan G. Theoharis et al.
eds., 1999) [hereinafter The FBI].
3. Kenneth S. Stem, A Force upon the Plain: The American Militia Movement
and the Politics of Hate 9 (1996).
4. Terrorism" Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong.
(Apr. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter, Chairman, Comm. on the
Judiciary), available at LEXIS, Federal News Service [hereinafter Specter Statement];
see Presidential Statement on Senate Passage of Antiterrorism Legislation, 31 Weekly
Comp. Pres. Doc. 993 (June 7, 1995), available at LEXIS, Public Papers of the
President ("I am gratified that the Senate has passed a sweeping, bipartisan
antiterrorism bill, as I called for in the wake of the bombing in Oklahoma City. This
legislation will give law enforcement the tools it needs to do everything possible to
prevent this kind of tragedy from happening again.").
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Act of 1996 ("AEDPA").5 While it addressed a variety of issues, the
legislation was a public response to terrorism.6 Its antiterrorism
measures, however, effectively function as "draconian immigration
law."7  At worst, AEDPA does "nothing" to prevent terrorism in
general;' at best, it fights international terrorism,9 not the domestic
terrorism involved in Oklahoma City.
AEDPA's terrorism-related provisions have been harshly criticized
as "extraordinary violations of many fundamental rights, including
free speech, free association, due process, [and] fair trial."' 0 While
such critics have attacked the individual provisions of the Act on
constitutional grounds," this Note seeks to scrutinize AEDPA
through the broader notion of "equal justice."'" Specifically, three of
its most controversial provisions13 will be discussed. 4 One provision
5. AEDPA is titled as "[an Act [t]o deter terrorism, provide justice for victims,
provide for an effective death penalty, and for other purposes." Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
Among its various non-terrorism provisions are revision of the process for habeas
corpus appeals of state-level criminal convictions in federal courts, including capital
punishment cases; requirements for victim restitution by certain criminal offenders-
modification of criminal laws concerning nuclear materials and biological and
chemical weapons; and requirements for the marking of plastic explosives. See Cong.
Info. Serv., C.I.S./Annual 1996-Legislative Histories of U.S. Public Laws 155 (1997),
available at LEXIS, CIS Legislative History.
6. See James X. Dempsey & David Cole, Terrorism & the Constitution:
Sacrificing Civil Liberties in the Name of National Security 114 (1999) (describing the
political pressure for antiterrorism legislation that resulted from the Oklahoma City
bombing); Richard Lacayo, Rushing to Bash Outsiders, Time, May 1, 1995, at 70
(reporting that antiterrorism legislative proposals before the Oklahoma City bombing
were "low-profile" and changed to "top priority" afterward).
7. Kevin R. Johnson, The Antiterrorism Act, the Immigration Reform Act, and
Ideological Regulation in the Immigration Laws: Important Lessons for Citizens and
Noncitizens, 28 St. Mary's L.J. 833, 839 (1997).
8. Nadine Strossen, The Current Assault on Constitutional Rights and Civil
Liberties: Origins and Approaches, 99 W. Va. L. Rev. 769, 771 (1997); see also Cato
Institute, Cato Handbook for Congress, 105th Congress (1998), at
http://www.cato.org//pubs/handbooklhblO5-21.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2001)
("While the 1995 terrorism bill, one of the most repressive measures ever enacted by
the U.S. Congress, was promoted as a response to the Oklahoma City bombing, not a
single item in the entire bill would have prevented that heinous crime or assisted in its
solution." (emphasis added)).
9. See discussion infra Part I.C.1; Lacayo, supra note 6 (asserting, before the
Oklahoma City culprits were definitely identified, that federal antiterrorism measures
pushed in the wake of Oklahoma City were "pointed in the wrong direction" if the act
was committed by Americans).
10. Strossen, supra note 8, at 787.
11. See generally Susan M. Akram, Scheherezade Meets Kafka: Two Dozen Sordid
Tales of Ideological Exclusion, 14 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 51, 51-52 (1999) (criticizing the
secret evidence provision); David Cole, Hanging with the Wrong Crowd: Of Gangs,
Terrorists, and the Right of Association, 1999 Sup. Ct. Rev. 203, 246-48 (1999)
[hereinafter Cole, Hanging with the Wrong Crowd] (criticizing the fundraising
provision); Strossen, supra note 8, at 786-91 (criticizing various provisions).
12. See discussion infra Part I.A.
13. See Akram, supra note 11, at 70-71. See generally Johnson, supra note 7, at
877 (arguing that AEDPA restricts alien rights in order to preserve the existing social
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permits the government to deport "alien terrorists" based on secret
evidence. 15 Another provides for the designation of "foreign terrorist
organizations,"16 and it works in tandem with the third provision,
which prohibits fundraising intended for such organizations.'7
Arabs"8 in America19 have been particularly burdened by AEDPA.
Of the approximately two dozen immigrants currently detained on
order); Strossen, supra note 8, at 787 (arguing that AEDPA authorizes "extraordinary
violations of many fundamental rights").
14. Professor Susan Akram has identified another troublesome AEDPA
provision. See Akram, supra note 11, at 71. Section 411 prevents an individual from
being admitted into the United States if he or she was a member of a "foreign
terrorist organization, as designated by the Secretary [of State]." AEDPA § 411
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(V) (1999)). See generally Robert Plotkin, First
Amendment Challenges to the Membership and Advocacy Provisions of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 10 Geo. Immigr. I.. 623. 625-
26 (1996) (criticizing AEDPA's provision for excluding and deporting aliens because
of their membership in a foreign terrorist organization or advocacy of terrorism).
Because there appears to have been few, if any. noteworthy cases involving the
deportation of an alien solely based on his membership, however, this Note will focus
on the secret evidence and fundraising prohibitions. See Telephone Interview with
Kareem Shora, Esq., Legal Advisor, American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee
(Jan. 19, 2001) (stating that he was not aware of people being deported solely based
on their membership with a "foreign terrorist organization").
15. Section 401 of AEDPA amended the Immigration and Nationality Act
("INA") by creating a removal court for "alien terrorists" in which "[tihe judge shall
examine, ex parte and in camera, any evidence for which the Attorney General
determines that public disclosure would pose a risk to the national security of the
United States or to the security of any individual because it would disclose classified
information." AEDPA § 401 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1534 (e)(3)(A)). An -alien
terrorist" is "[a]ny alien who has engaged, is engaged. or at any time after admission
engages in any terrorist activity," which may include an act that merely "affords
material support to [any person or group] ... conducting a terrorist activity."
AEDPA § 401 (codified at 8 U.S.C. H9 1531(1), 1227(a)(4)(B), 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)).
16. Section 303 states that a person who "knowingly provides material support or
resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both." AEDPA
§ 303 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2000)).
17. Section 302 amended the INA by providing for the designation of -foreign
terrorist organization[s]" by the Secretary of State for two year periods. A group may
be designated as such "if the Secretary finds that (A) the organization is a foreign
organization; (B) the organization engages in terrorist activity (as defined in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(3)(B)); and (C) the terrorist activity of the organization threatens the
security of United States nationals or the national security of the United States."
AEDPA § 302 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1) (Supp. V 2000)).
18. "Arab" generally refers to peoples from the Arabic-speaking nations of
Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania. Morocco,
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia. Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates,
Yemen, and portions of Somalia and Djibouti, as well as Palestinians. Michael W.
Suleiman, Introduction" The Arab Immigrant Experience, in Arabs in America:
Building a New Future 1, 1 (Michael W. Suleiman ed., 1999): see also Albert Hourani,
A History of the Arab Peoples 478-79 (Warner Books 1992) (1991) (identifying all
members of the League of Arab States (the "League")). The League is a group
formed in 1945 to encourage and formalize Arab unity. See id. at 355-56. The
membership list is identical to those Arab nations identified by Michael Suleiman. See
Suleiman, supra, at 1. But see Suad Joseph, Against the Grain of the Nation-The
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secret evidence, almost all are either Arab or Muslim.20  Of the
twenty-eight "foreign terrorist organizations" designated by the
Secretary of State in 1999, half are either Muslim or Arab.2" These
burdens have been imposed despite the fact that Arabs have been
responsible for very few terrorist attacks on American soil. 22 This
Note places the Arab experience in the context of American history,
where society has repeatedly targeted and stigmatized immigrant
groups and ethnic minorities, and contends AEDPA is a modern
example of such discrimination. Specifically, AEDPA violates the
principle of "equal justice" by unjustly stigmatizing Arab people in
America. "Equal justice," as derived from ancient philosophy and
American constitutional principles, demands equal treatment of the
law to prevent stigmatization of certain groups and guarantee their
optimal contribution to society.23
Part I places AEDPA in an appropriate historical context. It
defines a principle of "equal justice" consistent with ancient Greek
Arab-, in Arabs in America, supra, 257, 260 (arguing that it is impossible to find an
agreed definition for "Arab"). This Note will also consider Iran as an Arab nation
because discrimination against Iranian-Americans during the 1979 hostage crisis has
been considered the first prominent example of anti-Arab bias. See infra text
accompanying notes 194, 287. Although Turkey, in its previous incarnation as the
Ottoman Empire, extended to much of the Arab world, see Hourani, supra, at 472-75,
it will not be considered Arab for the purposes of this Note since it is not a member of
the League.
19. This Note will use the term "Arab" to refer to either American citizens of
Arab descent (i.e., Arab Americans) or Arab people present in the United States
without citizenship. Collectively, the groups will be referred to as "Arabs in
America."
20. Susan Aschoff, Bail Is Granted in Secret Evidence Case, St. Petersburg Times,
Dec. 7, 2000, at 1A [hereinafter Aschoff, Bail is Granted].
21. The fourteen Arab or Muslim groups are al Qa'ida, Abu Nidal Organization,
Abu Sayyaf Group, Armed Islamic Group, Gama'a al-Islamiyya, Hamas, Harakat ul-
Mujahideen, Hizballah, al-Jihad, Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization, Palestine Islamic
Jihad-Shaqaqi Faction, Palestine Liberation Front-Abu Abbas Faction, Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine-General Command. See Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 64
Fed. Reg. 55,112 (Oct. 8, 1999) [hereinafter Designation of Foreign Terrorist
Organizations]; U.S. Dep't of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1998, in 17
Terrorism: Documents of International and Local Control 165, 238-67 (Yonah
Alexander & Donald J. Musch eds., 1999) [hereinafter 1998 Global Terrorism
Report] (describing the activities and areas of various international terrorist groups).
In comparison, there are two Israeli groups (Kach and Kahane Chai), two Japanese
groups (Aum Shinrikyo and Japanese Red Army), two Turkish groups (Kurdistan
Workers' Party and Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front), two Colombian
groups (National Liberation Army and Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia),
two Greek groups (Revolutionary Organization 17 November and Revolutionary
People's Struggle), two Peruvian groups (Shining Path and Tupac Amaru
Revolutionary Movement), one Spanish group (Basque Fatherland and Liberty), and
one Sri Lankan group (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam). See Designation of
Foreign Terrorist Organizations, supra; 1998 Global Terrorism Report, supra, at 238-
67.
22. Infra text accompanying note 24; discussion infra Part II.A-B.
23. Infra text accompanying notes 52-53.
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thought and American constitutional ideals. This part also discusses
the historical basis of inequality in America, and it presents AEDPA
as a continuation of that unfortunate tradition. Part II examines the
sources of terrorism in the United States by both international and
domestic groups. Of the eighty-seven terrorist incidents in the United
States from 1984 to 1998, only one other act of terrorism, besides the
World Trade Center ("WTC") bombing, was tied to an Arab group.24
In contrast, during the same period, numerous terrorist acts and
potential acts were tied to domestic and extreme right-wing groups.?
Part II then describes anti-Arab bias in the United States over the last
thirty years. This ingrained attitude is consistent with the American
inclination to target foreign minorities in a time of crisis. This part
also considers the impact of unconscious racial bias in the criminal
justice system, where prosecution of the 1990s' two most notorious
terrorist bombings indicated that Arabs, as opposed to domestic
terrorists, were the more dangerous threat.
Part III argues that AEDPA's enforcement directly stigmatizes
Arabs and indirectly encourages societal discrimination. Together,
the two effects violate "equal justice" by affecting Arab self-esteem
and disabling their political, social, and economic participation in, and
contributions to, American society. Part III suggests a number of
corrective measures including revising the foreign terrorist
organization designation process, government tracking of anti-Arab
hate crimes, and the adoption of two pending proposals that repeal
the use of secret evidence and restrict the investigative excesses of the
government. It concludes by asserting that society must achieve equal
24. For the total number of terrorist incidents in the United States as well as those
linked to domestic and international groups, see Counterterrorism Threat Assessment
and Warning Unit, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Terrorism in the United States: 1998, at 23,
available at http:llwww.fbi.govllibrarylterrorlterr98.pdf [hereinafter 1998 U.S.
Terrorism Report] (listing, for 1990 through 1998, thirty terrorist incidents including
two tied to international groups); FBI, Terrorism in the United States: 1993, in 9
Terrorism: Documents of International and Local Control 431, 445-46 (Howard S.
Levie ed., 1996) (indicating, for 1989, four terrorist incidents, and noting that no acts
of international terrorism occurred in the United States from 1984 through 1992);
Terrorist Research and Analytical Center, FBI, Terrorism in the United States: 1988,
in The 1988-89 Annual on Terrorism 39, 50 (Yonah Alexander & Abraham H.
Foxman eds., 1990) (listing, for 1987 and 1988, sixteen terrorist incidents); Terrorist
Research and Analytical Center, FBI, Analysis of Terrorist Incidents in the United
States: 1986, in The 1987 Annual on Terrorism 191, 201 (Yonah Alexander &
Abraham H. Foxman eds., 1989) (listing, for 1984 through 1986, thirty-seven terrorist
incidents). The terrorism records relied upon here are those which are publicly
available because the author did not have access to classified information maintained
by the Justice or Defense Departments.
25. See, e.g., discussion infra Part II.B.1-2 (detailing extreme right-wing terrorist
activity which included, inter alia, the mid-1980s crime spree of The Order, two 1993
pipe bombings in the state of Washington; a 1995 conspiracy to use a biological
weapon in Minnesota; a 1996 conspiracy to blow up several federal buildings in West
Virginia; and 1997-98 bombings of women's health clinics).
2001] 2829
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justice for Arabs in America and, more importantly, for all
Americans.
I. THE DISPARITIES OF EQUAL JUSTICE
A. The Ideals of "Equal Justice"
Although there are many relevant definitions of "equal justice," this
Note identifies two in particular: first, a theoretical understanding of
"equal justice" as originated in classical Greek antiquity and, second,
the American conception of "equal justice" which is inextricably tied
with, and given substance by, the constitutional guarantee of "equal
protection of the laws."26 This Note will primarily rely on the latter
understanding because it is substantively recognized in American
jurisprudence. As will be illustrated, however, American "equal
justice" also assures the more abstract classical "equal justice."
"Justice" is a common, yet difficult to define, word. Its definition
can be circular,27 relativistic,' or uninspiring.29  Eric Rakowski
adopted Aristotle's definition that "justice is some kind of equality,"30
but limited his notion of "justice" to equality of "resources and
opportunities. '31 Antiquity offered a similar focus upon opportunity.
In the Socratic dialogues of Plato's Republic, Socrates contended that
in a just society "everyone must pursue [the] occupation ... for which
his nature best fitted him. 32 Attainment of this natural position ought
not be thwarted or affected by, for example, wealth or the mob.33
Justice, in other words, is the realization and fulfillment of one's
natural abilities. An unjust society will undermine and prevent such
accomplishment.
What, however, is "equality?" It can simply be defined as the state
of being "identical."'  Thus, "equal justice" ensures that people have
identical opportunities to realize and fulfill their natural abilities.
Understanding this classical principle is not merely academic because,
as Gordon Wood observed, both the Founding Fathers and
Revolutionary America in general had a "compulsive interest in the
ancient republics [that] was... crucial to their attempt to understand
26. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4.
27. Justice is "the maintenance.., of what is just." Webster's Ninth New
Collegiate Dictionary 655 (1988) [hereinafter Webster's Dictionary].
28. Justice is "the quality of conforming to law," whatever that law may be. Id.
29. Justice is "the administration of law." Id.
30. Eric Rakowski, Equal Justice 1 (1991) (quoting Aristotle, Politics 1282 b18).
31. Id. (describing that justice focuses upon fortune and the equality thereof).
32. Plato, The Republic 97-98 (G.M.A. Grube trans., Hacket Publishing Co.
1974).
33. Id. at 99.
34. See Webster's Dictionary, supra note 27, at 420.
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the moral and social basis of politics."35 The Founders wrestled with
the principles of Plato and Aristotle, among other epic thinkers, in
formulating their governmental experiment.- Although classical
thought does not bind American constitutional principles, it casts a
profound light on them.
Equal justice in America more narrowly focuses on how people are
treated by the law,37 which is reflected in the heralded words inscribed
on the United States Supreme Court building: "Equal Justice Under
Law. ' 38 Indeed, the principle of equality "is one of the great themes"
in American culture.39  As Kenneth Karst has written, "From the
Declaration of Independence to the pledge of allegiance, the rhetoric
of equality permeates our symbols of nationhood. Over and over in
our history, from the earliest colonial beginnings, equality has been a
rallying cry, a promise, an article of national faith."'
Discussion of equality centers upon the post-Civil War Fourteenth
Amendment and Equal Protection Clause,4' yet the notion of equality
has evolved throughout American history.42 The Declaration of
Independence righteously asserted the "self-evident" truth that "all
men are created equal, 43 but the proposition was only applicable to
white men.4 The Civil War was imbued with "egalitarian rhetoric,"45
which became entrenched in the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee
that no State shall "deny to any person.., the equal protection of the
laws,"' including non-whites in the rhetoric for the first timer' Later,
35. Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, at 50
(W.W. Norton & Co. 1972) (1969).
36. Id. at 8.
37. Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 Phil. & Pub. Aff.
107, 119-20 (1976) (stating that "equal justice" prohibits adjudicators from
considering "certain irrelevant characteristics," like race or wealth, of people who
appear before the court).
38. Kenneth L. Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 Ga. L. Rev. 245. 247 (1983)
[hereinafter Karst, Why Equality Matters].
39. Kenneth L. Karst, Belonging to America: Equal Citizenship and the
Constitution 1 (1989) [hereinafter Karst, Belonging to America].
40. Id.
41. See Karst, Why Equality Matters, supra note 38, at 247 ("[T]he equality that
matters in our Supreme Court is not the simple abstraction that likes should be
treated alike. It is the equality guaranteed in the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment and elsewhere in the Constitution.").
42. For recent evolution of the concept of equality, compare Joseph Tussman &
Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Cal. L Rev. 341, 344 (1949)
(stating that equality required that "those who are similarly situated be similarly
treated") with Karst, Why Equality Matters. supra note 38, at 249 (stating that
equality, as a substantive constitutional right, is "the right not to be stigmatized by the
organized community.").
43. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
44. See J. R. Pole, The Pursuit of Equality in American History 5 (2d ed. rev'd
1993).
45. Karst, Why Equality Matters, supra note 38. at 270.
46. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4.
47. See Gerald Gunther & Kathleen M. Sullivan. Constitutional Law 628 (13th ed.
2001] 2831
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the struggle for equality resurfaced in the twentieth century's civil
rights movement.48 At the core of the Fourteenth Amendment is "the
presumptive right 'to be treated by the organized society as a
respected, responsible, and participating member.' ' '49 The principle of
"equal citizenship" thus prohibits stigmatizing members of society, 0
thereby protecting self-respect and encouraging personal aspirations."
These protective concerns dovetail with the rationale underlying
ancient "equal justice.""2 The American principle mandates that the
law does not stigmatize people and therefore prevents the state from
impeding individual or group accomplishment. The ancient principle
goes beyond this negative rule to affirmatively assert that people must
have equal opportunity to realize their potential, which, in effect,
provides the rationale for "equal protection of the laws."53
When free from stigma, one shares more fully in the public life,
and fulfills the obligations of a citizen to, for example, obey the law
and care for oneself.5  By preventing stigmatization, society
empowers people to achieve within the polity. As a full participant,
an individual can realize his or her potential; he or she can attain a
natural, or optimal, position in society. Further, it reinforces self-
respect within minority groups 5 6 which encourages cultural identity
and group membership. 7 These dynamics, however, do not merely
benefit minority group members but rather serve "important roles in
supporting a vibrant community and society" empowered to
contribute to the polity.58 Thus, equality is essential not just to benefit
the minority groups it protects, but to benefit the entire democracy.
Additionally, "equal justice" ensures the proper functioning of the
American democracy by protecting "discrete and insular minorities"
against the prejudice59 which "distorts reality."'  By eliminating this
1997).
4& See Kenneth L. Karst, Citizenship, Race, and Marginality, 30 Wm. & Mary L.
Rev. 1, 2 (1988).
49. Karst, Why Equality Matters, supra note 38, at 247-48.
50. Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal
Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 6 (1977)
[hereinafter Karst, 1976 Term Foreword].
51. See id. at 6-7; see also Tseming Yang, Race, Religion, and Cultural Identity:
Reconciling the Jurisprudence of Race and Religion, 73 Ind. L.J. 119, 127 (1997).
52. See supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
53. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4.
54. Karst, 1976 Term Foreword, supra note 50, at 9.
55. Id. at 9-10.
56. See Yang, supra note 51, at 127, 133-34.
57. See id. (noting that discrimination and exclusion affect race and religion,
qualities which "are indicative of an individual's self-identity and sense of belonging
to a particular cultural community").
58. Id. at 133.
59. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
60. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 153
(1980).
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distortion, various groups are able to recognize their "overlapping
interests"61 and not be blinded by irrational hostilities toward a racial
minority.6' The political system thereby avoids the "violence of
faction" that James Madison considered the propensity of popular
government-a vice which results in the "mortal diseases" of
"instability, injustice, and confusion. '
B. The Reality of "Unequal Justice"
Despite the ever-present theme of equality, inequality has existed
throughout American history for many visible minorities and foreign-
born residents and citizens.' The compromises reached at the
Constitutional Convention to ensure that southern states joined the
Union illustrate the fledgling nation's equivocal commitment to
equality.6' The most portentous compromises were the continuation
of African slavery, the twenty-year postponement of the termination
of the slave trade, and the valuation of each African as merely three-
fifths of a person for representational purposes.' Eighty years later,
the United States Supreme Court found it "absolutely certain" that
the Founding Fathers neither included nor contemplated inclusion of
the "African race" under the meaning of citizen.67 Stephen Douglas,
during the Lincoln-Douglas debates, shared this view and
unambiguously extended it to all other races.
[A] negro is not and never ought to be a citizen of the United States.
I hold that this Government was made on the white basis by white
men, for the benefit of white men and their posterity forever, and
should be administered by white men and none others.... [Tihe
signers of the Declaration[,] ... when they declared all men to be
created equal ... desired to express by that phrase white men, men
of European birth and European descent, and had no reference
either to the negro, the savage Indians, the Fejee [sic], the Malay, or
any other inferior and degraded race .... 68
61. Id.
62. Id. ("Race prejudice divides groups that have much in common (blacks and
poor whites) and unites groups (white, rich and poor) that have little else in common
than their antagonism for the racial minority.") (quoting Frank Goodman, De Facto
School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 60 Cal. L Rev. 275, 315
(1972)).
63. The Federalist No. 10, at 45 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
64. Arabs in America are both new arrivals to the nation and a visible minority.
Because they are implicated by AEDPA as immigrants, however, this section will
briefly address discrimination against both such groups and focus on discrimination
against those who are foreign-born.
65. See Karst, Belonging to America, supra note 39, at 48.
66. Id.
67. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393,423 (1856).
68. Peter Westen, The Meaning of Equality in Lawy, Science, Math, and Morals: A
Reply, 81 Mich. L. Rev. 604, 605-06 (1983) (quoting Speech of Stephen A. Douglas at
Jonesboro (Sept. 15, 1858), in Political Debates Between Hon. Abraham Lincoln and
2001] 2833
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Still one century later, Jim Crow laws continued to consign African
Americans to a subordinate status.69
While the story of African Americans provides the most prominent
example of discrimination against visible minorities, other groups
have also been subordinated based on their foreignness and perceived
disloyalty. As Natsu Taylor Saito explained, "[t]he American
identification of foreign origins with disloyalty to the United States...
has been a prominent theme throughout American legal history."7 In
the nation's early years, the Alien Enemies Act of 1798,1 in
conjunction with the Sedition Act of 1798,72 was enforced primarily
against foreigners who criticized the government.73
In the nineteenth century, the United States opened its borders to
Chinese immigration, which provided cheap, flexible labor for the
growing nation .7  Because of anti-alien sentiment 75 and pervasive
stereotypes of the Chinese, however, restrictive immigration laws
were eventually passed. For example, an 1875 federal statute
prohibited immigration by criminals and prostitutes, which were
widespread stereotypes of the Chinese.76 The Chinese were also
perceived as racially inferior. In 1876, a congressional committee
reported: "There is not sufficient brain capacity in the Chinese race to
furnish motive power for self-government. Upon the point of morals,
there is no Aryan or European race which is not far superior to the
Chinese."77 Five years later, as the need for cheap labor subsided,78
the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 explicitly excluded Chinese from
immigration to the United States79 and continued to do so for sixty-
Hon. Stephen A. Douglas 116 (1860)).
69. See Karst, Belonging to America, supra note 39, at 64-69.
70. Natsu Taylor Saito, Alien and Non-Alien Alike: Citizenship, "Foreignness,"
and Racial Hierarchy in American Law, 76 Or. L. Rev. 261, 278 (1997) (emphasis
added) (quoting Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice. Reevaluating "National
Origin" Discrimination Under Title VII, 35 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 805, 855 (1994)).
71. "The Alien Enemies Act of 1798 allowed the President, in his discretion, to
seize and summarily deport an alien ... ." Saito, supra note 70, at 278.
72. The Sedition Act of 1798 made it a crime to strongly criticize government
officials. Id. at 279.
73. Id.
74. Foreign labor was considered desirable because it kept the labor force divided
by ethnicities, it was a bargaining chip when American labor demanded higher pay
and better working conditions, and it was an easily controllable labor source which
could simply be let go when production demands eased. See id. at 298-99.
75. Anti-alien fervor took root in the western United States after the Panic of
1873, the Depression of 1877, and a contemporaneous drought. See id. at 299.
76. Id. at 299-300.
77. Kitty Calavita, The Paradoxes of Race, Class, Identity, and "Passing":
Enforcing the Chinese Exclusion Acts, 1882-1910,25 Law & Soc. Inquiry 1, 4 (2000).
78. Saito, supra note 70, at 299 (describing the declining demand for Chinese
labor as the transcontinental railroad was completed, the Gold Rush ended, and
economic crises hit the country).
79. Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, § 1, 22 Stat. 58, 59 (1882) (repealed 1943)
("[T]he coming of Chinese laborers to the United States ... is... suspended; and
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one years.'0 Although the legislation had resulted from a treaty with
China, in 1884 Congress expanded the prohibition to anyone of
Chinese descent." Three subsequent Supreme Court cases
concerning the Exclusion Act affirmed the "foreignness" stigma
attached to Chinese.' They were considered outsiders threatening to
overwhelm the nation and endanger stability.83
During this time, California state and local authorities also
subjected the Chinese to unequal treatment.' In 1876, the state
sought to impress its anti-Chinese sentiment upon the nation by
issuing a report to Congress entitled "An Address to the People of the
United States upon the Evils of Chinese Immigration."'  The
landmark case, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, recounted a San Francisco
ordinance which made it a misdemeanor to operate a laundry without
the consent of a municipal board unless the laundry's building was
made of brick or stone. 6 Evidence showed that more than 150
Chinese citizens were arrested for operating a laundry in a wooden
building while none of the non-Chinese operators in wooden buildings
were arrested.' Additionally, the board denied permission to
during such suspension it shall not be lawful for any Chinese laborer to come, or,
having so come after [enactment][,J ... to remain within the United States.").
80. See Saito, supra note 70, at 300.
81. See Neil Gotanda, Comparative Racialization: Racial Profiling and the Case of
Wen Ho Lee, 47 UCLA L. Rev. 1689, 1697-98 (2000); Act of July 5, 1884, ch. 220,
§ 15, 23 Stat. 115, 118 (1884) (repealed 1943) ("[T]he provisions of [the Chinese
Exclusion Act] shall apply to all subjects of China and Chinese, whether subjects of
China or any other foreign power."). The Exclusion Act's ambiguity was revealed in
a Massachusetts case where the court refused to apply the legislation to a British
subject born in Hong Kong and of Chinese ancestry because it considered "Chinese"
a political, not racial, term. See Gotanda, supra, at 1697-98 (citing United States v.
Douglas, 17 F. 634 (C.C.D. Mass. 1883)).
82. See Gotanda, supra note 81, at 1698-1701 (comparing Chew Heong v. United
States, 112 U.S. 536 (1884); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); and
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893)). In Fong Yue Ting, the Court
found
After some years' experience ... the government of the United States was
brought to the opinion that the presence within our territory of large
numbers of Chinese laborers, of a distinct race and religion, remaining
strangers in the land, residing apart by themselves, tenaciously adhering to
the customs and usages of their own country, unfamiliar with our
institutions, and apparently incapable of assimilating with our people, might
endanger good order, and be injurious to the public interests ....
l at 1701 (quoting Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 717).
83. See Gotanda, supra note 81, at 1699-1701.
84. See Calavita, supra note 77, at 4 ("Since the early 1850s, a virulent anti-
Chinese movement in California... had produced numerous state and municipal laws
aimed at restricting participation of the Chinese in certain industries and controlling
Chinese immigration to that state." (citations omitted)).
85. Id.
86. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
87. Id. at 359.
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continue business to 201 Chinese petitioners while granting
permission to all but one non-Chinese. 8
The internment of over 110,000 Japanese Americans during World
War 1189 provides the most recent and chilling example of unequal
treatment of a foreign group in the United States. "Few episodes in
American history," Peter Irons wrote, "have been as widely
condemned." 9  As early as 1945, Eugene Rostow criticized the
Japanese internments in The Yale Law Journal as "the worst blow our
liberties have sustained in many years."91 Starting in 1942, Japanese
Americans were confined behind the barbed wire of internment
camps spread from Arkansas swamps to California deserts.' After
Japan's surrender in 1945, it took almost an entire year for some
internees to finally be released. 3
The road to internment began in February 1942 when President
Roosevelt granted authority to Henry Stimson, then Secretary of War,
to establish military zones "from which any or all persons" could be
excluded.94 By the end of the year, almost all Japanese Americans on
the West Coast, pursuant to military orders, were removed to
internment camps.95 The Supreme Court, in the landmark case of
Korematsu v. United States, upheld internment as constitutional based
on the following rationale:
[Toyosaburo Korematsu] was excluded because we are at war with
the Japanese Empire, because the properly constituted military
authorities feared an invasion of our West Coast and felt
constrained to take proper security measures, because they decided
that the military urgency of the situation demanded that all citizens
of Japanese ancestry be segregated from the West Coast
temporarily, and finally, because Congress, reposing its confidence
in this time of war in our military leaders-as inevitably it must-
determined that they should have the power to do just this.9 6
Contrary to the military's estimates of danger, however, racial
prejudice was the "dominant factor" in the decision to intern. 97
88. Id. at 359, 374. The United States Supreme Court ultimately found that such
treatment was unconstitutional because it violated the equal protection clause. See id.
at 374; see also Amy Grossman Applegate, Prosecutorial Discretion and
Discrimination in the Decision to Charge, 55 Temple L.Q. 35, 41-42 (1982) (discussing
Yick Wo v. Hopkins).
89. Peter Irons, Justice at War, at vii (1983).
90. Justice Delayed: The Record of the Japanese American Internment Cases, at
ix (Peter Irons ed., 1989).
91. Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases-A Disaster, 54 Yale L.J.
489, 490 (1945).
92. Irons, supra note 89, at vii, 7.
93. Id. at 7.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,223 (1944) (emphasis omitted).
97. Rostow, supra note 91, at 496. Professor Rostow noted that labor leaders,
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Indeed, there was little, if any, justification for targeting the Japanese
as a threat.9 8 No person of Japanese ancestry had ever been convicted
for sabotage or espionage as a Japanese agent" whereas many
Caucasian persons were. °° Congressional testimony by General John
L. Dewitt, who played a "central role" in the decision to intern,"t 1
illustrates the virulent prejudice behind the internment decision.
[There is] development of a false sentiment on the part of certain
individuals and some organizations to get the Japanese back on the
west coast. I don't want any of them here. The) are a dangerous
element. There is no way to determine their loyalty .... The danger
of the Japanese was, and is now-if they are permitted to come
back-espionage and sabotage. It makes no difference whether he is
an American citizen, he is still a Japanese. American citizenship does
not necessarily determine loyalty .... You needn't worry about the
Italians at all except in certain cases. Also, the same for the
Germans except in individual cases. But we must worry about the
Japanese all the time until he is wiped off the map.102
Notably, Italian and German nationals living in the United States
were not interned'0 3 while Japanese were, even if they were American
citizens. Additionally, the nation's policy did not actually protect
against the one threat that had struck American soil-Japan. The
bombing of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, showed that territory was
vulnerable in its proximity to Japan. The 160,000 Hawaiian Japanese
residents, however, were not interned en masse1W Moreover, forty-
three percent of the Japanese interned on the West Coast were under
"one of the strongest anti-Japanese groups in [the] West Coast," led resistance to
prevent returning Japanese to their homes. Id. at 501 n.35; see also Irons, supra note
89, at 9-13 (discussing the anti-Japanese sentiment that had existed in the West since
the end of the nineteenth century).
98. See Rostow, supra note 91, at 496-97; see also Irons, supra note 89, at 53-54
(describing the Attorney General's conversation with President Roosevelt in which
he contended that the Army offered no reason to justify mass evacuation).
99. Justice Delayed, supra note 90, at 105 (citing a 1982 report that there was -not
a single documented act of espionage, sabotage or fifth column activity... committed
by an American citizen of Japanese ancestry or by a resident Japanese alien on the
West Coast").
100. Rostow, supra note 91, at 497.
101. See Irons, supra note 89, at 25.
102. Rostow, supra note 91, at 531-32 (quoting Hearings Before Subcomnz. of
House Comm. on Naval Affairs on H. R. 30, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 739-40 (1943))
(emphasis added).
103. See Justice Delayed, supra note 90, at 105; see also Rostow, supra note 91, at
508 (noting that there were 690,000 Italians and 314,000 Germans living in the United
States at the time of the exclusion orders). While Professor Rostow did not clearly
state that his figures concerned Italian and German nationals, the fact that there were
more than eight million people of German descent living in the United States in 1917
leads to the conclusion that his numbers concerned only those of Italian and German
citizenship. See Justice Delayed, supra note 90, at 119.
104. Rostow, supra note 91, at 494.
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fifteen years of age or older than fifty,"05 certainly not the typical ages
for a saboteur.
Many, if not most, Americans probably consider themselves beyond
treating others with such overt unequal treatment, or "first-order"
discrimination, whereby a group is excluded because of its race or
ethnicity.0 6 While many believe that society has moved beyond such
inequality, however, a new "second-order" discrimination manifests
itself under "facially innocent criteria."'0 7 A law may discriminate in
the purpose of its enactment and enforcement, rather than on its
face. 8 More generally, people may discriminate based on the
"unconscious racism" which pervades all of American society."0 9
Charles Lawrence described the inculcation of such racism:
Americans share a common historical and cultural heritage in which
racism has played and still plays a dominant role. Because of this
shared experience, we also inevitably share many ideas, attitudes,
and beliefs that attach significance to an individual's race and induce
negative feelings and opinions about nonwhites. To the extent that
this cultural belief system has influenced all of us, we are all racists.
At the same time, most of us are unaware of our racism. We do not
recognize the ways in which our cultural experience has influenced
our beliefs about race or the occasions on which those beliefs affect
our actions. In other words, a large part of the behavior that
produces racial discrimination is influenced by unconscious racial
motivation.110
Thus, discrimination against a group may exist without any intent to
treat that group differently because of their race.
The case of Wen Ho Lee offers a current example of unconscious
racism.1  The United States government investigated Lee, an
105. Id. at 507 (citing U.S. Army, Western Defense Command, Final Report,
Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast, 1942 (1943, released 1944)).
106. See Fiss, supra note 37, at 170-71.
107. Id. at 171; see also James Waller, Face to Face: The Changing State of Racism
Across America 6 (1998) ("Like a clever virus, old-fashioned racism responded to the
escalation of tolerant social and legal reforms by mutating into more subtle, covert,
and socially acceptable modem forms of racism.").
108. Cf Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317, 318-21 (1987) (objecting to the
doctrine of discriminatory purpose that a plaintiff must satisfy to challenge the
discriminatory effect of a "facially neutral law" because it requires proof of
discriminatory purpose and supporting, alternatively, the view that disproportionate
impact of a law should trigger constitutional protections).
109. See id. at 329-44.
110. Id. at 322.
111. See Gotanda, supra note 81, at 1690-91 (contending that "the case against Wen
Ho Lee [was] about race" and exemplified "racial profiling"). For a summary of the
Lee case, see Matthew Purdy, The Making of a Suspect: The Case of Wen Ho Lee,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 2001, at Al and Matthew Purdy & James Sterngold, The
Prosecution Unravels: The Case of Wen Ho Lee, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 2001, at Al, a
two-part series reviewing the development and resolution of the Wen Ho Lee case.
2838 [Vol. 69
UNEQUAL JUSTICE
American scientist born in Taiwan, for stealing nuclear secrets that
government experts contended were the "crown jewels" of the nuclear
weapons program.1 12 The investigation, begun in 1995, resulted in a
fifty-nine count indictment accusing Lee of mishandling classified
information to benefit a foreign nation based on his downloading of
nuclear weapon secrets to ten computer tapes."t 3  Before trial,
prosecutors imprisoned Lee in solitary confinement, shackled for nine
months, on the grounds that he "could cause the loss of 'hundreds of
millions of lives.' 1
14
Asian American groups and the American Civil Liberties Union
charged that the scientist was unfairly singled out because of his
Chinese ancestry. Indeed, government intelligence officials had
asserted that it was appropriate to place Asian Americans under
special scrutiny because Chinese spies focused their recruiting efforts
on them.116 While one may defend such heightened monitoring as a
means to protect sensitive nuclear secrets, investigators prosecuted
Lee when "a lot of Caucasians" behaving similarly were not
charged.1 17 Moreover, some experts contended that the information
Lee had downloaded was insignificant, certainly not of the sensitivity
maintained by the government."1
The question of discriminatory prosecution grew so prominent that
the judge ordered prosecutors to turn over thousands of pages of
documents so that he could assess the possibility of selective
112. James Sterngold, U.S. to Reduce Case Against Scientist to a Single Charge-
Surprise Plea Bargain, N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 2000, at Al.
113. James Sterngold, Nuclear Scientist Set Free After Plea in Secrets Case; Judge
Attacks U.S. Conduct, N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 2000, at Al [hereinafter Sterngold,
Nuclear Scientist Set Free].
114. Id.
115. Joint Press Statement by Asian Pacific American Organizations Regarding
Wen Ho Lee (Dec. 16, 1999), available at http:lwww.ocanatl.orgjpr.htm; James
Sterngold, Judge Orders U.S. to Turn Over Data in Secrets Inquiry: A Prosecution
Setback, N.Y. Times, Aug. 30,2000, at Al [hereinafter Sterngold, Judge Orders U.S.]
116. Sterngold, Nuclear Scientist Set Free, supra note 113.
117. William J. Broad, Bias Seen in Spy Case, N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1999, §4 (Week
in Review), at 2 (quoting the former head of counterintelligence at Wen Ho Lee's lab
as stating that "[a] lot of Caucasians with equivalent access to secrets and trips to
China were not investigated" (internal quotes omitted)).
118. James Risen & Jeff Gerth, U.S. Says Suspect Put Code Ot Bombs in Unsecure
Files, N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1999, at Al ("[Olne American scientist said the codes and
accompanying data [transferred by Lee] were not, by themselves, sufficient to
produce an exact copy of an American weapon."), James Sterngold, Defense Argues
Ethnicity Made Scientist a Suspect, N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 2000, at A20. The New York
Times reported:
The defense has affidavits from a former director of the Los Alamos
National Laboratory and other experts arguing that much of what Dr. Lee
downloaded ... was either already available publicly or would be of modest
use or none to most countries, and was not even given a secret classification
until after Dr. Lee had been fired ....
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prosecution. 19 The actual weakness of the government's case, as well
as the exaggeration of the charges against Lee that had justified his
harsh pre-trial confinement, were exposed' 20 when prosecutors agreed
to drop all but one charge in a plea deal, which resulted in a sentence
of time served in exchange for Lee's cooperation with investigators. 2,'
After Lee's release, President Clinton expressed his own misgivings
about Lee's possibly inflated indictment.22
The fact that the President joined the presiding judge in questioning
the prosecutors' case suggests that they both suspected the
government's investigation of the Taiwanese American was rooted in
more than just facts. Indeed, White House Press Secretary Joe
Lockhart suggested that unfounded fears about Chinese espionage,
fanned by "near hysterical investigative reporting" and "explosive
comments from political leaders," may have influenced the
prosecutors' decisions." 3 Although Lee avoided the serious prison
119. Sterngold, Judge Orders U.S., supra note 115.
120. See Statement by Judge in Los Alamos Case, With Apology for Abuse of
Power, N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 2000, at A25. The judge asked rhetorically of Dr. Lee:
What was the government's motive in insisting on your being jailed pretrial
under extraordinarily onerous conditions of confinement until today, when
the executive branch agrees that you may be set free essentially
unrestricted? ... Why were you charged with the many Atomic Energy Act
counts for which the penalty is life imprisonment, all of which the executive
branch has now moved to dismiss and which I just dismissed?
Id.
121. See Sterngold, Nuclear Scientist Set Free, supra note 113; James Sterngold,
Prosecutors Cancel First Appointment to Debrief Wen Ho Lee, N.Y. Times, Oct. 7,
2000, at A9.
122. David Johnston, Clinton Criticizes Officials' Actions Against Scientist: "Quite
Troubling to Me", N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 2000, at Al. The New York Times quoted
President Clinton as saying:
I always had reservations about the claims that were being made denying
him bail.... So the whole thing was quite troubling to me and I think it's
very difficult to reconcile the two positions that one day he's a terrible risk
to the national security and the next day they're making a plea agreement
for an offense far more modest than what had been alleged.
Id.
123. Clinton and Aide Answer Questions, N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 2000, at A12; see
The Times and Wen Ho Lee, N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 2000, at A2 [hereinafter The Times
and Wen Ho Lee] (referring to media industry criticism that New York Times
reporting "had stimulated a political frenzy amounting to a witch hunt"); see also
Edward Liu, Case of the Los Alamos Spy; Is Wen Ho Lee Guilty of Espionage or
Ethnicity?, S.F. Chron., Mar. 22, 1999, at A21 ("Despite any facts or even charges,
many journalists, talk-show hosts and public officials have attacked like barracudas
since The New York Times broke the story."); Robert Scheer, Spy Scandal Is Much
Ado About Nothing, L.A. Times, Mar. 16, 1999, at B7 ("The current China spy
hysteria is based on a hyping of threats that are woefully irrational."). While
defending its reporting, the New York Times noted several deficiencies in its coverage
of Wen Ho Lee, including its failure to temper inflammatory declarations such as Lee
"may be responsible for the most damaging espionage of the post-cold war era." See
The Times and Wen Ho Lee, supra (internal quotes omitted). For examples of the
"near hysterical" newspaper coverage, see Editorial, Blunders at Los Alamos, Atlanta
Const., Apr. 30, 1999, at A22 (calling the possible computer code loss the "country's
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time that the media and prosecution called for, his experience
underscores the entrenched nature of xenophobia and racism that
continues in American society.
C. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
Some contend that AEDPA continues the American history of
discrimination against foreigners.124  First, particular aspects of
AEDPA's legislative history indicate that its promulgation may have
been improperly motivated by fears of foreign terrorist attacks. 125
Additionally, AIEDPA's three controversial provisions- those which
establish the process for designating "foreign terrorist organizations,"
prohibit fundraising for such groups, and authorize the use of secret
evidence-may be discriminatorily applied.' -6
1. Legislative History
Although the terrorist bombing in Oklahoma City spurred
AEDPA's enactment,127 the legislation has been harshly criticized as
an election year ploy,'28 doing little for terrorism and a lot to oppress
foreigners. 29 Legislators reacted to public concerns about both safety
and the economy by producing a "quick fix" solution directed at
foreigners who historically have provided a convenient scapegoat
during times of social anxiety.130
most serious espionage loss in a generation and perhaps ranks with the most serious
in its history"); Editorial, The China Blind Spot, N.Y. Times, May 16, 1999, §4, at 16
("It is hard to imagine a more damaging American security failure than the serial
hemorrhage of nuclear-weapons secrets and other military information to China over
the last two decades."); Debra J. Saunders, Editorial, America's Doormat Says: Spies
Welcome, S.F. Chron., May 28, 1999, at A25 (criticizing prosecutors for not
aggressively pursuing Lee).
124. See Akram, supra note 11, at 53-55; see also Johnson, supra note 7, at 834-39.
125. See discussion infra Part I.C.1.
126. See discussion infra Parts I.C.2-4.
127. See Specter Statement, supra note 4 ("What happened last week in Oklahoma
City was an unspeakable tragedy.... We in Washington have no more solemn
responsibility in this time of national suffering then to ensure that there is never
another Oklahoma City."); Remarks on Antiterrorism Legislation, 31 Weekly Comp.
Pres. Doc. 789 (May 8, 1995), available at LEXIS, Public Papers of the President (-I
sent that [antiterrorism legislation] to Congress because it will strengthen our ability
to investigate and prosecute and to deter... the kind of horror we endured at
Oklahoma City and of course at the World Trade Center.")
128. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 877 ("In an election year... it was difficult for
any member of Congress to vote against a bill entitled the 'Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996'-whatever its provisions ... "); Strossen, supra
note 8, at 771 (describing the support presidential candidates President Bill Clinton
and Senator Bob Dole gave to AEDPA as the political atmosphere became hostile
toward civil liberties).
129. See supra text accompanying notes 7-9.
130. See Strossen, supra note 8, at 777.
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While a number of speakers at Congressional hearings warned of
the international terrorist threat, 3' the hearings inadequately
addressed the domestic group threat revealed by Oklahoma City.1 32
Ambassador Philip Wilcox, Jr., who participated in drafting the
proposed Act, warned that "Islamic extremist groups are fighting a
vicious rear guard action against [Middle East] peace [efforts].' 33
Deputy Attorney General Jamie S. Gorelick illustrated the Clinton
Administration's fixation on international terrorism when she insisted
that the Oklahoma City bombing must be seen in the broader context
of a disparate list of terrorist acts which included the 1988 bombing of
Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland; the 1993 WTC bombing;
the April 1995 Tokyo nerve gas attack by a domestic Japanese group;
the 1995 murder of two American consulate employees in Pakistan;
and only one other domestic terrorist event involving a domestic
group. 34 Similarly, in stating its support for the legislative measures,
the Anti-Defamation League placed Oklahoma City exclusively in the
context of overseas-related terrorism.135  Discussion of domestic
militia groups and views opposing the legislation 3 6 apparently had
131. See infra text accompanying notes 133-35.
132. Editorial, The Militia Threat, N.Y. Times, June 14, 1997, at 20 ("The
[Oklahoma City] bombing has not spurred the political action that it should.
Congress has held only two days of hearings on the militia movement...."); cf
Dempsey & Cole, supra note 6, at 107-10 (describing AEDPA hearings as "one-
sided" as most witnesses were "strongly and uncritically supportive" of the
legislation).
133. Counterterrorism Legislation: Hearing on S. 390, A Bill to Improve the Ability
of the United States to Respond to the International Terrorist Threat, and S. 735, A Bill
to Combat Terrorism Before the Senate Subcomm. on Terrorism, Technology, and
Gov't Info. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 11 (May 4, 1995) [hereinafter
Counterterrorism Legislation Hearing] (statement of Philip C. Wilcox, Jr.,
Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Dep't of State), available at LEXIS, Federal News
Service.
134. See Combating Domestic Terrorism: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on
Crime of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 8 (May 3, 1995) (statement of
Jamie S. Gorelick, Deputy Attorney General, Dep't of Justice), available at LEXIS,
Federal News Service. The only other domestic event Gorelick mentioned involved
two people in Minnesota who made a deadly toxin with intent to use it. Id.
135. See International Terrorism: Threats and Responses: Hearings on H.R. 1710,
Comprehensive Antiterrorism Act of 1995, Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
104th Cong. 427-28 (June 13, 1995) [hereinafter International Terrorism Hearing]
(statement of Ruth Lansner, Chair, Nat'l Legal Affairs Comm., Anti-Defamation
League of B'Nai B'Rith), available at LEXIS, Federal News Service.
136. See, e.g., Terrorism in the United States: The Nature and Extent of the Threat
and Possible Legislative Responses: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 33-35 (Apr. 27, 1995) (statement of Ronald K. Noble, Under
Secretary for Enforcement, Dep't of the Treasury), available at LEXIS, Federal News
Service [hereinafter Noble Statement] (describing the increasing "anti-government
and anti-law enforcement violence" of radical right-wing groups); Counterterrorism
Legislation Hearing, supra note 133, at 45-49 (May 4, 1995) (statement of Robert S.
Rifkind, President, The American Jewish Comm.), available at LEXIS, Federal News
Service (opposing the secret evidence and fundraising prohibition provisions);
International Terrorism Hearing, supra note 135, at 319 (June 12, 1995) (statement of
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minimal impact because the legislation, as passed, was almost the
same as pre-Oklahoma City antiterrorism proposals. 3
To evaluate the Oklahoma City bombing in such a context would
likely slant legislation away from domestic groups and toward
international groups. President Clinton himself underscored the types
of threats AEDPA was directed against during his remarks at the
Act's signing, when he commented on the 1983 Marine barracks
bombing in Beirut; the 1985 Achille Latro hijacking outside
Alexandria, Egypt; the 1988 Lockerbie bombing; the 1993 WTC
bombing; and Oklahoma City.'- All incidents except Oklahoma City
were linked to Middle East groups. 39  AEDPA's proponents
seemingly responded to Oklahoma City by attacking international
terrorism instead of the most recent and real threat of domestic
terrorism. They evaluated their response in an international context
and not a domestic one, and instead of branding militias or other
right-wing groups as the primary "terrorist" threat and burdening
them with restrictive legislation, the government opted for the
politically easier group -foreigners.140
2. Designating a "Foreign Terrorist Organization"
AEDPA's fundraising prohibition restricts donations by American
sources to foreign terrorist organizations, but it first depends upon
which groups the Secretary of State designates as "foreign terrorist
organizations. '141 The Secretary may identify an organization as a
"foreign terrorist organization" for a two year period12 if it is (a) a
foreign organization (b) that engages in terrorist activity and (c) such
activity threatens the security of either the United States or its
citizens. 43 Classified information may be considered when making
the designation and is only disclosed for judicial review ex parte and
Gregory T. Nojeim, Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union), available
at LEXIS, Federal News Service (arguing that the proposed antiterrorism measures
do "substantial damage to civil liberties").
137. See Dempsey & Cole, supra note 6, at 105 (asserting that AEDPA included all
the "critical" provisions of an antiterrorism bill proposed by the Clinton
Administration two months before the Oklahoma City bombing).
138. See Remarks on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, 32 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 718 (April 29, 1996), available at LEXIS, Public
Papers of the President.
139. The Beirut bombing was tied to the Islamic Jihad. See Elisabeth Frater, When
the Evidence Is Secret, Nat'l J., Jan. 6, 2001, at 38. The Aciille Lauro hijacking was
attributed to Palestinians. See Alan Cowell, Hijacker Defends Achille Lauro Killing,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1988, at A3. The Lockerbie bombing was linked to Libyans. See
Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Libyan Convicted by Scottish Court in "88 Pan Am Blast, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 1, 2001, at Al.
140. See Strossen, supra note 8, at 777-78.
141. See generally AEDPA § 302 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (1999)), AEDPA
§ 303 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2000)).
142. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(4)(A).
143. See supra note 17.
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in camera.1" Within thirty days of the list's publication, organizations
may seek to have their designation reviewed by the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals,'145 but individual criminal
defendants may not question the validity of a designation.14 6  The
appeal is evaluated using five criteria 47 but the court is prohibited
from reviewing the Secretary's national security concerns 4 and it may
not evaluate the validity of material, even hearsay, considered by the
Secretary.149  Because of the tremendous deference given to the
Secretary of State and the vagueness of AEDPA's criteria, which
could describe "hundreds if not thousands of groups worldwide,"
selective enforcement based upon the "politics of the moment" is
inevitable.'
3. Prohibiting Material Support
The restrictions placed upon anyone attempting to provide material
support or resources to any designated group are substantial. 5,
144. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(3)(B).
145. Id. § 1189(b)(1).
146. Id. § 1189(a)(8).
147. The statutory standards for the court are the following:
Scope of Review.
The Court shall hold unlawful and set aside a designation the court finds to
be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitation, or short of
statutory right;
(D) lacking substantial support in the administrative record taken as a whole
or in classified information submitted to the court under paragraph (2), or
(E) not in accord with the procedures required by law.
AEDPA § 302 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1189(b)(3)).
148. See People's Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. United States, 182 F.3d 17, 23-24 (D.C.
Cir. 1999) (finding the court may not consider the third criteria for designating a
"foreign terrorist organization," whether the group's activity threatens security, see
supra note 17, because it relates to the Executive Branch's foreign policy decision-
making which is "not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry" (quoting Chicago &
Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948))).
149. The court in People's Mojahedin indicated its frustration with not being able
to evaluate hearsay evidence:
We reach no judgment whatsoever regarding whether the material before
the Secretary is or is not true.... [T]he record consists entirely of hearsay,
none of it was ever subjected to adversary testing, and there was no
opportunity for counter-evidence by the organizations affected.... [The
Secretary's] conclusion [that the organizations were foreign and engaged in
terrorism] might be mistaken, but that depends on the quality of the
information in the reports she received-something we have no way of
judging.
182 F.3d at 25.
150. Dempsey & Cole, supra note 6, at 120-21.
151. See Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1132 (9th Cir. 2000)
(saying the AEDPA provision for foreign terrorist organizations "has teeth").
2844 [Vol. 69
UNEQUAL JUSTICE
Anyone within or subject to United States jurisdiction may be fined or
imprisoned for up to ten years if he or she "knowingly provides
material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or
attempts or conspires to do so. '152 Because of AEDPA's concern with
cutting off all support, it accounts for the fungibility of money with
particularly uncompromising results.
Under [AEDPA], it is a crime to send crayons to a day-care center
or blankets to a health care facility run by a designated group, even
if the donor can prove that he intended the crayons or blankets to be
used for lawful purposes and that they were in fact so used ...
[because] money that a terrorist group saves on donated crayons
could be used to purchase bombs.'
Furthermore, financial institutions that become aware they possess or
control funds of a foreign terrorist organization or its agent must
retain those funds and report to the Treasury Department or be
subject to fines starting at $50,000.1'
David Cole has criticized AEDPA's fundraising prohibition as
unconstitutional 155 because the right to associate is not effective
without the right to financially support one's chosen group.'-6 Such an
infringement is particularly debilitating in a republic, where the right
to association is indispensable to the effective functioning of the
government.157 Moreover, the sole circuit court assigned to hear an
organization's appeal of its designation suggested that the designation
process itself may be flawed. 5 8
4. Using Secret Evidence
Section 401 of AEDPA amended a prior immigration act'59 to allow
secret evidence in deportation hearings against alien terrorists. Under
this provision of AEDPA, an "alien terrorist"' "6 detained on secret
152. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2000). Included as "material support or resources"
are "currency or other financial securities, financial services, lodging, training,
safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment,
facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel, transportation, and other
physical assets, except medicine or religious materials." Id. 88 2339B(g)(4), 2339A(b).
But see Humanitarian Law Project, 205 F.3d at 1137-38 (upholding a district court
ruling that "training" and "personnel" were impermissibly vague and unenforceable).
153. Cole, Hanging with the Wrong Crowd, supra note 11, at 247.
154. AEDPA § 302 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339B(a)(2), 2339B(b)).
155. See Cole, Hanging with the Wrong Crowd, supra note 11, at 246-50.
156. ld. at 248.
157. Id. at 250-51.
158. See 8 U.S.C. § 1189(b)(1) (1999) ("[A]n organization... may seek judicial
review of the designation in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit."); supra note 149.
159. See AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 401(a), 110 Stat. 1214. 1258 (1996)
(codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1531-37) (amending the Immigration and Nationality Act).
160. AEDPA § 401 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1531) (establishing the term "alien
terrorist"); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(B) (defining that an alien terrorist is one "who has
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evidence has his or her case heard before a removal court16' where
due process procedures allow him or her to have an unclassified
summary' 62 of the government's secret evidence and a hearing before
a federal judge. 63 Oddly, however, the government has never
detained an alien under AEDPA. 164 Rather, critics contend, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") has used AEDPA to
expand powers under its own less restrictive immigration regulations
concerning secret evidence. 165  AEDPA, in essence, signaled to the
INS that there was political support to apply INS secret evidence
procedures more aggressively.1 66 The dramatic increase in INS cases
relying on secret evidence since AEDPA's passage provides
compelling support. From 1988 to 1999, almost every secret evidence
case arose in the four-year period after AEDPA passed in 1996.167
engaged, is engaged, or at any time after admission engages in any terrorist activity");
id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) (defining "engage in terrorist activity").
161. Id. § 1533.
162. Id. § 1534(e)(3)(B)-(C).
163. Frater, supra note 139 (summarizing the critical aspects of AEDPA's secret
evidence provisions); AEDPA § 401(a) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1532) (establishing a
removal court composed of five federal district court judges).
164. Frater, supra note 139 (reporting that an INS spokesman acknowledged that
"the INS has not prosecuted a single case under [AEDPA's] procedures"); Akram,
supra note 11, at 72.
165. Akram, supra note 11, at 72 ("[T]he INS has not prosecuted a single case
under the special 'alien terrorist' removal procedures authorized by AEDPA.
Instead, acting on the perceived authority of these provisions, the INS began relying
on a particular [earlier] provision in the immigration regulations...."); see also
Margaret Graham Tebo, Locked Up Tight, A.B.A. J., Nov. 2000, at 44, 48 ("In
regulations crafted in light of the [AEDPA's] statutory changes, the INS outlined
other expanded powers for itself.").
166. See Susan Aschoff, The Politics of Immigration, St. Petersburg Times, Dec. 21,
1997, at 1F [hereinafter Aschoff, Politics of Immigration] ("The INS has had [secret
evidence] power for years, but its new aggressiveness reflects Congress' get-tough
directive, the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1996."); Telephone Interview with Professor
Susan M. Akram, Clinical Professor of Immigration and Comparative Refugee Law,
Boston University School of Law and Supervising Attorney, Boston University Civil
Litigation Program (Jan. 23, 2001). Professor Akram has been involved in the secret
evidence cases for Mazen al-Najjar and Anwar Haddam. Frater, supra note 139;
Akram, supra note 11, at 51 n.*.
167. According to the most comprehensive information available, there have been
thirty-three secret evidence cases since 1987. See Akram, supra note 11, at 52 n.4
(listing twenty-six people who have faced or were facing proceedings dependent on
secret evidence and reporting six new cases for which the names were not available);
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 1996-97 Report on Hate Crimes &
Discrimination Against Arab Americans 32 (1997) [hereinafter 1996-97 ADC Report]
(listing one additional case concerning Anwar Haddam). Excluding the "Los Angeles
Eight" defendants whose cases began in 1987, see Akram, supra note 11, at 73, there
have been, at most, 25 cases since 1987. Of those 25 cases, at least 19 were initiated
after AEDPA passed. See David Cole, INS Terrorizes Arabs in the U.S., Legal Times,
May 18, 1998, at 29 [hereinafter Cole, INS Terrorizes Arabs] (indicating that the
following cases were instituted after AEDPA was passed: Mazzen al-Najjar, Ali
Termos, Hany Kiareldeen, Yahia Meddiah); Akram, supra note 11, at 52 n.4, 76, 78 (6
unidentified individuals, Nasser Ahmed, and the "Iraqi Seven"); 1996-97 ADC
Report, supra, at 32 (Anwar Haddam).
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The INS method is to conduct "routine deportation hearings"
against a suspected terrorist, which allow the Service to deny bond for
release based on secret evidence in an immigration court.'1s
Proceeding against suspects in the immigration court system places
the suspect at a unique disadvantage. First, immigration judges are
not able to address constitutional issues because their positions are
administrative.1 69 Thus, an immigration court may not consider the
due process concerns of presenting evidence that is unreviewable by
the defendant. Second, INS regulations do not require a summary of
classified evidence for a suspected alien. "' Third, by proceeding in
immigration courts, the government avoids having to actually charge
someone with terrorist activity, which carries a higher burden of
proof. 171 Fourth, the Justice Department oversees immigration
courts.'72 As a result, a suspect's case may be investigated, prosecuted,
and adjudicated exclusively within one department of the executive
branch-respectively, by the FBI, federal attorneys, and immigration
courts.73 Without a systematic check against prosecutorial abuses or
mistakes, a defendant who cannot see the evidence against him or her
is in an extremely disadvantaged position from which to avoid
prosecution.
In reviewing one secret evidence case, Judge William Walls
expressed that "reliance on secret evidence raises serious issues about
the integrity of the adversarial process, the impossibility of self-
defense against undisclosed charges, and the reliability of government
processes initiated and prosecuted in darkness." 74 In another case,
the judge wrote, "[t]he poisonous atmosphere created by secret
accusation is impossible to completely eradicate," even if such tactics
are helpful in antiterrorism measures."7s David Cole has criticized the
tactic as raising "serious constitutional questions," particularly in its
application against deportees accused of being members of terrorist
groups.
176
168. Frater, supra note 139 (reporting the "far from unique" example of Mazen al-
Najjar's case and describing the general INS technique).
169. See Akram, supra note 11, at 72; see also Susan Aschoff, Accused of Being
Suspicious, St. Petersburg Times, May 7, 2000, at 1F [hereinafter Aschoff, Accused of
Being Suspicious].
170. Akram, supra note 11, at 72.
171. See id
172. Susan Aschoff, In Immigration Even Judges May Not See Evidence, St.
Petersburg Times, Sept. 6,1999, at 1A [hereinafter Aschoff, In Immigration]
173. See id.
174. Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F. Supp. 2d 402, 413 (D.N.J. 1999). The court
ultimately ordered that the defendant, Hany Mahmoud Kiareldeen, be released. Id. at
419.
175. Aschoff, In Immigration, supra note 172 (quoting immigration Judge Donn
Livingston upon releasing Nasser Ahmed).
176. Cole, INS Terrorizes Arabs, supra note 167.
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To lock up any human being based on secret evidence is to deny him
the most basic component of due process-a meaningful opportunity
to defend oneself. It is simply impossible to defend against secret
evidence: How do you prove that you are not a member of a
terrorist organization, where there is no evidence to refute and the
organization hasn't even been named?
177
Susan Akram identified some of the specific governmental abuses
secret evidence facilitates. She found that the government made
allegations without evidentiary support, mistranslated evidence, and
erroneously classified documents. 17 8  Former Central Intelligence
Agency Director James Woolsey gained access to previously secret
documents when he stepped in to represent a group of detained
Iraqis. 79 He found "serious errors" in Arabic-English translations,
stereotyping based on both ethnicity and religion, and allegations
rooted in rumors and inter-group rivalry.'80
For almost four years newspapers across the country have
expressed opposition to secret evidence proceedings.'8' In addition,
over one hundred congressional representatives have stated their
opposition by introducing the Secret Evidence Repeal Act, sponsored
by Representative David Bonior of Michigan. 182 Finding the use of
secret evidence in immigration actions unconstitutional, 18 3 the bill
proposes repealing its use in a number of different immigration
proceedings.1  While encouraging, the bill remains nothing more
than an expression of disapproval because it has been pending since
June 1999.185
In summary, this part has established the background necessary for
evaluating AEDPA. Equal justice demands equal and unstigmatizing
treatment of all groups and people in order to ensure they realize
177. Id.
178. Akram, supra note 11, at 81-90.
179. See infra text accompanying notes 432-39 (discussing the cases of the "Iraqi
Seven").
180. Akram, supra note 11, at 87-88.
181. E.g., Anthony Lewis, Op-Ed, The Uses of Secrecy, N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 2000, at
A21; Bill Maxwell, Secret Evidence Prevents Basic Fairness, St. Petersburg Times,
June 4, 2000, at 1D; Ralph Ranalli, Security Laws Tilt Balance of Rights, Boston
Globe, Feb. 20, 2000, at B1; Nat Hentoff, Op-Ed, Prosecution in Darkness, Wash.
Post, Nov. 6, 1999, at A25; Ronald Smothers, U.S. Bars or Expels Suspect Immigrants
On Secret Evidence, N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1998, at Al; Bill Maxwell, Enter Here, and
Abandon Basic Rights, St. Petersburg Times, Sept. 28, 1997, at 1D.
182. Secret Evidence Repeal Act of 2000, H.R. 2121, 106th Cong. (2000), available
at http://thomas.loc.govlhome/cl06query.html.
183. Id. § 2(3) ("Use of secret evidence in immigration proceedings deprives the
alien of due process rights guaranteed under the United States Constitution and
undermines our adversarial system, which relies on cross-examination as an engine of
truth-seeking.")
184. Id. §§ 3-6.
185. See id. (stating the bill's date of introduction as June 10, 1999).
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their full potential.1" The history of the United States, however,
presents an enduring trend of discrimination against foreigners and
minorities. 18' Recently, the United States government enacted
antiterrorism legislation directed against foreign threats, providing for
the designation of foreign terrorist organizations, the prohibition of
fundraising for such organizations, and the authorization of secret
evidence in certain immigrant deportation hearings.ss The next part
will examine recent terrorist activity in the United States and illustrate
the extent of Arab involvement, as well as society's perception of
Arab involvement, in such activity.
II. THE UNJUSTIFIED LINK BETWEEN ARABS AND
DOMESTIC TERRORISM
This part will determine whether AEDPA properly focused on
Arabs as a domestic terrorist threat, particularly in light of the
Oklahoma City bombing. Although Arabs have been involved in
terrorist activity, very little terrorism on American soil has involved
Arab groups."8 In contrast, domestic groups, militia, and other right-
wing extremists in particular, have been prominent sources of
terrorism."9  This part concludes by presenting the anti-Arab
sentiment that pervades American society, and attributing AEDPA's
treatment of Arabs to such racism."'
A. Arabs and Terrorism in the United States
The current plight of Arab Americans is a striking example of
inequality in the United States as members of the group are subject to
restrictive, if not draconian, immigration laws and often are branded
with the label of disloyalty. The perception of Arabs as terrorists has
come to dominate the public imagination."9 The Los Angeles Times
eloquently described the common perception: "[W]ords and images
[run] together like watercolors on a child's easel-Arabs, mosque,
terrorism, Muslims, extremists-making it hard to tell where one
began and another left off."' 93 This almost reflexive association
became ingrained during the Iranian hostage crisis in 1979 and the
Persian Gulf War in 1991.9' The hostage-taking left an indelible
186. See discussion supra Part I.A.
187. See discussion supra Part I.B.
188. See discussion supra Part I.C.
189. See discussion infra Part II.A.
190. See discussion infra Part II.B.
191. See discussion infra Part II.C.
192. Ileana M. Porras, On Terrorism: Reflections on Violence and the Outlaw, 1994
Utah L. Rev. 119, 134.
193. Larry B. Stammer & Somini Sengupta, Muslims Enter American Mainstream,
L.A. Times, Apr. 6, 1993, at 4 (italics omitted), available at LEXIS. News, Los
Angeles Times.
194. See Lynne Duke, Islam Is Growing in U.S., Despite an Uneasy Image:
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impression on Americans, "strik[ing] this country with thunderclap
force, becoming a crisis of an overwhelming and all-absorbing
nature."'95  Unfortunately, network television news presented a
skewed perspective, showing the audience images of "fist-shaking
[Iranian] mobs" outside the embassy while barely explaining the
"internal Iranian setting" which made the hostage crisis so
intractable.196 Ten years later, the Persian Gulf War and the constant
barrage of its images provided by CNN reinforced American
perception of Arabs as the enemy as bombs rained down on Baghdad.
Moreover, while they are closely associated with Islam, only twelve
percent of the United States' four to five million Muslims are Arab"9
and those Arab Muslims comprise a minority of the Arab American
community. 9 8 American society, however, identifies Arabs and Islam
as virtually one and the same.199 Coupled with this presumption is the
prevailing misrepresentation of Islam as bent on a holy war against
the United States.2" While extremists may invoke the Koran to justify
terrorism,2. 0 the "vast majority" of Islamic worshippers are "decent,
law-abiding, productive citizens." 2" Even those who commit
terrorism in the name of Islam decry the inaction of "fellow"
Muslims.203
Particularly for Immigrants, Anxiety Lingers About American Attitudes, Wash. Post,
Oct. 24, 1993, at Al.
195. Don Oberdorfer, Why the Hostage Crisis Held Us All Hostage, Wash. Post,
Feb. 1, 1981, at Cl.
196. Id. (describing a study by an Arizona State University professor finding that
"the network evening news programs, in ten sample periods over eight months,
beamed Iranian crowds and demonstrations into American homes on sixty occasions,
compared to only three interviews with unofficial, non-demonstrating Iranians who
might have explained what the crowds were screaming about").
197. See Duke, supra note 194. Non-Arab Muslims include African Americans (42
percent), Indians or Pakistanis (25 percent), Africans (5 percent), Iranians (4
percent), Turks (4 percent), Southeast Asians (4 percent), and Caucasians (4 percent).
Id.
198. This fact is determined by taking 12 percent of the nation's four to five million
Muslims (480,000 to 600,000) and comparing it to the overall Arab population of 2.5
to 3 million. Id.; Suleiman, supra note 18, at 2.
199. See Joseph, supra note 18, at 260.
200. See id. at 261. As Suad Joseph observed:
Some political analysts have argued that Islam is the West's new evil empire.
Islam is frequently represented as a militaristic religion bent on jihad (holy
war), inherently and historically hostile to the democratic, capitalist,
Christian West.... Adherents of Islam are frequently viewed as mindless,
fanatic followers of mad clerics.
Id.
201. See, e.g., Brief for Appellee at 58, United States v. Siddig Ali, (2d Cir. 1999)
(No. 96-1044(L)) (on file with the Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter Appellee Brief]
(quoting a speech by Sheik Ahmad Ali Abdel Rahman in which he stated, "the
[Koran] makes [terrorism] among the means to performjihad in the sake of Allah,...
to terrorize the enemies of God and our enemies too").
202. Editorial, Don't Judge Islam by Verdicts, Orlando Sentinel, Mar. 8, 1994, at
A10.
203. Two members of the terrorist conspiracy to blow up New York City
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From 1984 through 1998, of the eighty-seven terrorist incidents in
the United States, two were committed by Arab groups.2 11 The
February 26, 1993, noontime bombing of the WTC, which killed six
people and injured more than one thousand,0 5 was the more frightful
event. After the FBI traced a van believed to have contained the
bomb to one suspect, four Arab men were arrested and ultimately
sentenced to 240 years in prison. 6 Fearing that the bombing was
merely part of an ongoing conspiracy, the FBI intensified surveillance
of New York-area Islamic fundamentalists.0 7
In June 1993, authorities finally uncovered an organization plotting
numerous terrorist acts, of which the WTC bombing was a "small
part." The terrorist conspiracy had targeted the United Nations
building, the Holland and Lincoln Tunnels, and the George
Washington Bridge.' They had also plotted to assassinate a number
of important public figures, including former Egyptian President
Hosni Mubarak,210 and considered kidnapping others.2 " They were
motivated by a desire to advance Muslim interests by striking the
United States in order to alter its Middle East policies. 21 Ten people
landmarks expressed such frustration. Siddig Ibrahim Siddig Ali saw himself and
fellow conspirators as "among the 'very few Muslims' willing to 'strike back' against
their oppressors." Appellee Brief, supra note 201, at 153. Similarly, Mohammed
Saleh observed that in their fthad, "Muslims will remain as stones to be played with
and kicked around everywhere.... And unfortunately, there is [sic] no Muslims to
retaliate.... To have weight anywhere.... It's a disaster." Id. at 137 (omissions in
original).
204. See supra text accompanying note 24.
205. The FBI, supra note 2, at 94.
206. Id. at 94-95. Two other Arab suspects, Ramzi Yousef and Eyad Ismoil, were
also later arrested. Id. at 95
207. Id
208. Mary B.W. Tabor, U.S. Indicts Egyptian Cleric as Head of Group Plotting
'War of Urban Terrorism', N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1993, at Al (quoting assistant United
States' Attorney Andrew McCarthy (internal quotes omitted)); see Appellee Brief,
supra note 201, at 8 (describing that members of the terror conspiracy were part of an
organization that had been involved with the WTC bombing); see also id. at 89(quoting a recording of one conspirator who stated that "the [WTCJ operation was
not done by a single person. It was a group effort. We all had confidence in [the
WTC bombers]" (ellipses omitted)).
209. The FBI, supra note 2, at 95.
210. Tabor, supra note 208.
211. See Ralph Blumenthal, Plot to Abduct Niron to Free Blast Suspects, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 6, 1993, at 17 (reporting that suspects considered kidnapping former
President Richard M. Nixon and former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger).
212 See The FBI, supra note 2, at 94; see also Appellee Brief, supra note 201, at 93
(referring to a discussion among conspirators that the United Nations would be a
desirable target because it "was a prime tool through which the United States
operated a 'new government which rules the world' and executed resolutions
oppressive to Muslims everywhere"); id. at 96 (considering the lower Manhattan
offices of the FBI as a target because it would encourage "Muslims all over the
world"); id. at 98 (considering the kidnapping of former President Nixon and former
Secretary Kissinger because they had depicted Islam as a "great" threat and stating
that Nixon had maintained an American presence in the Middle East "to demolish
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were ultimately convicted of "seditious conspiracy to wage war against
the United States and forcibly to oppose its authority" for engaging in
their "war of urban terrorism." '13 They received sentences ranging
from twenty-five years to life imprisonment.2 14  Three others were
found guilty on other charges.215
The only other Arab terrorism on American soil, as reported by the
FBI from 1984 to April 1996 (when AEDPA was enacted), was a
limited incident in April 1992.216 Five opponents of Iran's Islamic
government, bearing knives, invaded the Iranian mission to the
United Nations.2 17  During their two-hour takeover they destroyed
property and took three hostages. 18 The attack, part of a coordinated
attack on Iranian embassies and consulates in nine other nations, was
a retaliation for Iran's bombing of the rebels' base in Iraq and
evidently not directed at the United States.219 Because the violence
was driven by intra-Arab issues, it doubtlessly raised far less public
concern than the later WTC-related activity.
According to the FBI, after AEDPA's enactment in 1996, no Arab
groups were definitively involved in any of the nine terrorist incidents
in the United States through 1998, although two failed letter bombs in
1997 were traced to Egypt.2 1 Of thirty-seven potential terrorist events
from April 1996 through 1998, eleven were attributed to international
sources, only one of which was actually tied to an Arab source. 2' In
the Islamic awakening in any... countries" of the region); id. at 108 (referring to the
planned bombings of the Lincoln and Holland tunnels as ones which "would paralyze
the economy" and that such bombing must be "under the flag of God" (internal
quotes omitted)).
213. Appellee Brief, supra note 201, at 2, 7.
214. Id. at 7.
215. The FBI, supra note 2, at 95.
216. 1998 U.S. Terrorism Report, supra note 24, at 23.
217. See Robert D. McFadden, Iran Rebels Hit Missions in 10 Nations, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 6, 1992, at A3.
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. See 1998 U.S. Terrorism Report, supra note 24, at 24 (listing terrorist incidents
and indicating no group identified as a main suspect in the letter bombings);
Counterterrorism Threat Assessment and Warning Unit, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Terrorism in the United States: 1997, at 2, available at http://www.fbi.gov/
library/terror/terr97.pdf [hereinafter 1997 U.S. Terrorism Report] (detailing the letter
bombing incidents in Washington, D.C. and Leavenworth, Kansas).
221. See 1998 U.S. Terrorism Report, supra note 24, at 5-7 (detailing 1998 terrorist
preventions); 1997 U.S. Terrorism Report, supra note 220, at 3-5 (detailing 1997
terrorist preventions and, in particular, ten failed letter bombs and a planned attack
by two Palestinian men on a New York City subway line); Counterterrorism Threat
Assessment and Warning Unit, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Terrorism in the United States:
1996, at 6-9, available at http://wwwv.fbi.gov/library/terror/terr96.pdf [hereinafter 1996
U.S. Terrorism Report] (detailing 1996 terrorist preventions). The FBI calls such
potential events "terrorist preventions." They are defined as "a documented instance
in which a violent act by a known or suspected terrorist group or individual with the
means and a proven propensity for violence is successfully interdicted through
investigative activity." 1998 U.S. Terrorism Report, supra note 24, at ii.
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one other notable incident, an Arab individual injured six people and
killed another along with himself atop the Empire State Building, but
he was not tied to any terrorist group and was considered by
authorities to be a "lone, deranged man.""'
There have also been a number of overseas terrorist acts by Arab
groups. With respect to pre-AEDPA incidents,2 the last major
international event, the Lockerbie bombing of Pan Am flight 103, had
been committed seven years before Oklahoma City. Since AEDPA
was enacted, the most notable overseas terrorist incidents by Arab or
Islamic groups against the United States were the 1996 truck bomb
explosion in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, which killed nineteen American
soldiers; the 1998 bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania which killed over two hundred people; and the 2000
bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen which killed seventeen
sailors. 24 These incidents may justify antiterrorism measures, but as
will be discussed in Part III, they neither adequately explain why
AEDPA failed to respond to domestic group threats nor why
AEDPA was directed at what might happen on American soil instead
of what actually happened on American soil. Moreover, the incidents
do not justify the branding of Arabs as terrorists while avoiding such
treatment of domestic groups.
B. Domestic Sources of Terrorism in the United States
FBI statistics indicate that most acts of domestic terrorism --26 are not
committed by Muslim or Arab groups. Indeed, from 1984 to 1998, 95
percent of the terrorist incidents in the United States were attributed
to domestic groups. 27 In the three years after the Oklahoma City
bombing, 1996 to 1998, almost 70 percent of all potential terrorist
events were attributed to domestic sources, and the figure climbs to 96
percent if we discount one series of intercepted letter bombs in
222. Matthew Purdy, Empire State Gunman Gave No Hint of Anger, His Hosts Say.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1997, at Bi; see also Robert D. McFadden, Shots Send Empire
State Crowd Fleeing, N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1997, at Al.
223. See supra text accompanying note 138.
224. See Craig Pyes et al., One Man and a Global Web of Violence, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 14,2001, at Al.
225. See infra text following notes 355,483.
226. "Terrorism" is defined by the federal government as "the unlawful use of
force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government,
the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social
objectives." 1998 U.S. Terrorism Report, supra note 24, at i (quoting 28 C.F.R. §
0.85).
227. See supra text accompanying note 24. This figure is determined by dividing
eighty-three, the number of incidents definitely not tied to international groups or
likely not tied to them (thus removing from the total number of terrorist incidents the
WTC bombing, the 1992 hostile takeover, and the two letter bombs), into the total
number of incidents, eighty-seven. See supra text accompanying notes 24, 205-07, 216-
20.
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1997.2z  More specifically, in 1993, for example, there were two
bombings by an extreme right-wing group in Tacoma, Washington,
and nine fire bombings by an animal rights group, the Animal
Liberation Front, in Chicago, Illinois. 9  In 1994, there were no
incidents of terrorism at all." Indeed, when AEDPA was passed in
1996, the looming threat was extreme right-wing domestic groups,
particularly militias. 1
Militia groups started appearing in 1994. The involvement of
Timothy McVeigh, who had lingered in the militia movement, in
Oklahoma City alerted the public to the militia danger but a number
of experts had already forecast the growing threat of right-wing
terrorism. In 1994, a detailed study of terrorism in America by Brent
L. Smith warned that "right-wing... terrorists show distinct promise
of increasing in number and activity."" 2  In October 1994, Morris
Dees of the Southern Poverty Law Center wrote to Attorney General
Janet Reno to warn her of the militia threat. 3  Responding to a
congressional request, Kenneth Stern issued a report warning of the
militia movement nine days before the Oklahoma City bombing.2 34
The militia movement is composed of armed, paramilitary,
extremist groups and sympathizers dedicated to armed opposition to
the allegedly tyrannical federal government, considered to be
conspiring globally in the "New World Order.""s The movement
consists of unrelated groups throughout the United States motivated
by recent firearm restrictions such as the Brady Law and fatal law
enforcement mistakes in Ruby Ridge, Idaho and Waco, Texas.
26
228. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
229. 1998 U.S. Terrorism Report, supra note 24, at 23-24.
230. Id. at 24.
231. See generally Morris Dees with James Corcoran, Gathering Storm: America's
Militia Threat (1996) (analyzing the development of militia groups and their
ideology); Stem, supra note 3 (same).
232. Brent L. Smith, Terrorism in America: Pipe Bombs and Pipe Dreams 200
(1994).
233. See Dees, supra note 231, at 6-7.
234. See Stem, supra note 3, at 13-15. Kenneth Stern has been a hate group expert
for the American Jewish Committee since 1989 and previously was the director of the
National Organization Against Terrorism. Id. at 304.
235. Mark Pitcavage, The Militia Watchdog [hereinafter Militia Watchdog], at
http://www.militia-watchdog.org/students.htm (last updated Nov. 1, 1998) (describing,
in the "Frequently Asked Questions" section, what a militia is). Dr. Pitcavage is
currently a director with the Anti-Defamation League. Militia Watchdog, supra, at
http://www.militia-watchdog.org/pitman.htm (last modified Sept. 4, 2000). He
previously worked as the Director of the Research Center for the State and Local
Anti-Terrorism Training Project, a government project to provide more information
about terrorism to state and local law enforcement authorities. Militia Watchdog,
supra, at http://www.militia-watchdog.org/students.htm (describing, in the
"Frequently Asked Questions" section, who Mark Pitcavage is).
236. Southern Poverty Law Center, False Patriots: The Threat of Antigovernment
Extremists 4 (1997). The Brady Law, passed in 1993, required a background check on
all gun purchasers and a waiting period of five days on the sale of all handguns. Dees,
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They are part of a broader "very, very extreme right-wing" movement
that believes in white supremacy, opposition to abortion, hatred of
homosexuality, hatred or fear of foreigners, and isolationism. -'w
While the words of right-wing militia interests are not, and should
not, be criminal unto themselves, they reveal a frightening world view
hardly different from that which is expressed by Arab extremists
invoking jihad to justify their violence. - A publication of the Militia
of Montana revealed the paranoia that drove their opposition to gun
control efforts:
There are individuals in this world, within this country, and in our
own government who would like to rule the world. These power
hungry individuals have corrupted our government and are working
on sabotaging our freedom by destroying the Constitution of the
United States, in order to establish the "New World Order."... To
bring about this New World Order, and ultimately the single World
Government, [they believe] the American people must be
disarmed. 239
William Pierce, the leader of a racist and anti-Semitic group called
the National Alliance, wrote an underground book, The Turner
Diaries, which he sells as a "Handbook for White Victory.""'
Timothy McVeigh had sold the book, his "bible," on the gun show
circuit.24 1 Over 200,000 copies of the book have been sold 42 The
1978 book depicts the bombing of a federal building that is ominously
similar to McVeigh's act243 and provides a chilling justification for the
violence.
It is a heavy burden of responsibility for us to bear since most of the
victims of our bomb were only pawns who were no more committed
to the sick philosophy or the racially destructive goals of the System
than we are .... But there is no way we can destroy the System
without hurting many thousands of innocent people-no way. It is a
cancer too deeply rooted in our flesh. And if we don't destroy the
System before it destroys us-if we don't cut this cancer out of our
living flesh-our whole [White] race will die.244
supra note 231, at 73-74. See infra text accompanying notes 249-58 for a discussion of
the incidents at Ruby Ridge and Waco.
237. Militia Watchdog, supra note 235, at httpJ/www.militia-watchdog.org/
students.htm (describing, in the "Frequently Asked Questions" section, what the
right-wing is).
238. See supra notes 201, 212.
239. Dees, supra note 231, at 80 (quoting a publication of the Militia of Montana)
(internal ellipses omitted).
240. Id. at 137-38.
241. Id. at 4, 156.
242. Id. at 137.
243. Id. at 146-47.
244. Id. at 147 (quoting a statement by the main character of The Turner Diaries).
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Sixteen years after the book's publication, Pierce remained
unrepentant in his hatred when he proclaimed, "millions of white
Americans who five years ago felt so cowed by the government and
[the Jewish-]controlled media... are becoming fed up, and their
exasperation is giving them courage" to join his movement.245
1. Terrorist Activity of Domestic Groups Prior to AEDPA
Violent activity and conspiracies have corresponded with such
words and ideology. In the mid-1980s, an Aryan Nation offshoot, The
Order, engaged in a rampage of violence to advance its revolution.246
Inspired by The Turner Diaries, they counterfeited money, robbed
over $4 million, bombed a synagogue, and killed at least three people
in their quest to overthrow the United States government and
establish an exclusively White fascist nation.247  Law enforcement
ultimately charged twenty-four members for racketeering based on
their various conspiracies; twenty-three people were convicted.248
Two confrontations in the early 1990s, at Ruby Ridge, Idaho and
Waco, Texas, served as catalysts for the militia movement.249
Although the episodes were not deemed official terrorist acts,2 these
fatal showdowns illustrated the fervent opposition of domestic right-
wing groups against the federal government. In 1992, in Ruby Ridge,
white separatist Randy Weaver, with his wife, four children, and a
family friend, resisted well over one hundred law enforcement
authorities after federal marshals attempted to arrest him for failing to
make a court date stemming from illegal gun sales.ul Protestors for
the Weavers carried signs saying "Government Lies, a Patriot Dies,"
"Christians Against Tyranny," and "FBI Burn in Hell. ' '112 Those in
support included Aryan Nation members, skinheads, and Order
members' families.253 After an eleven-day standoff, the bloodshed
underscored the vehemence of government opposition: three people
dead (a federal marshal, Weaver's wife Vicki and his son Sam) and
three people shot (a federal marshal, Weaver, and Weaver's friend).'
245. Id. at 5 (ellipses in original) (quoting Pierce).
246. See Stern, supra note 3, at 53-56.
247. See id.
248. Id. at 56.
249. See id. at 58 (contending that the standoffs at Ruby Ridge and Waco, along
with the passage of the Brady Bill, "catalyzed the growth of militia groups across
America").
250. See 1998 U.S. Terrorism Report, supra note 24, at 23-24 (reflecting the
absence of the incidents at Ruby Ridge, Idaho and Waco, Texas on the FBI's
summary of terrorist incidents from 1990 to 1998).
251. Stern, supra note 3, at 21-24.
252. Id. at 24-25.
253. Id. at 27.
254. Id. at 24. 25.31-32.
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The standoff in Waco, Texas truly "galvanized" the militia
movement; 5 it is quite possible that Timothy McVeigh memorialized
the Waco events by bombing the Murrah building on its two-year
anniversary. 6 Seeking to execute warrants for illegal firearms on the
Branch Davidian compound, federal authorities set off a fifty-one day
confrontation which resulted in, initially, a shootout that killed four
federal agents, wounded other agents, killed a few of the Branch
Davidians, and wounded two others and, ultimately, an inferno that
killed more than eighty people including children. -7 Waco, "with its
overtones of the abuse of state power" reflected by the tragedy,
stimulated the growth of the militia network." The escalating tension
and violence that the Davidians were willing to absorb in resisting the
government again illustrated the depth of anti-government sentiment.
In this context, the FBI recorded four incidents of right-wing
terrorism between 1990 and April 1996 (when AEDPA was signed
into law), including two July 1993 bombings in Washington state, by
the American Front Skinheads-one of a gay bar in Seattle and the
other of the NAACP headquarters in Tacoma. --9 More generally,
from 1989 through 1991, the Justice Department reported that the
number of bombing incidents in the United States increased from
1208 to 2499;16 none were acts of Arab terrorism.211 In 1993, there
were forty-three deaths and over three hundred injuries due to
bombings not tied to international terrorist groups.26z
Because the FBI's application of the "terrorist" label has often been
suspect and haphazard,213 other right-wing terrorist incidents and
255. Id at 63.
256. See Dees, supra note 231, at 157, 189 (noting that McVeigh .as very bothered
by the events at Waco and that the Oklahoma City bombing occurred on Waco's two-
year anniversary).
257. See Stern, supra note 3, at 59-60.
25& Id. at 63-64 (internal quotes omitted).
259. See Terrorist Research and Analytical Center, FBI, Terrorism in the United
States: 1994, in 13 Terrorism: Documents of International and Local Control 161. 173
(Donald J. Musch ed., 1997). Up the IRS, Inc. committed the other two right-wing
incidents in 1990 and 1991. Id. at 191.
260. See 139 Cong. Rec. 4220-21 (1993) (reporting a statement by Sen. Alfonse
D'Amato in which he cited the Department of Justice's 1991 Bomb Summary while
discussing the death penalty for acts of terrorism).
261. See supra text accompanying note 24 (indicating that the FBI recorded no acts
of international terrorism on United States soil from 1984 through 1991).
262. This figure was calculated by subtracting the WTC casualty numbers (six
deaths and approximately one thousand injured) from the total deaths and casualties
recorded for 1993 (forty-nine deaths and 1323 injured). See The FBI, supra note 2, at
94 (reporting that six people were killed and "more than 1000" were injured in the
WTC bombing); Noble Statement, supra note 136, at 33 (reporting that forty-nine
people were killed and 1323 were injured in 1993 by bombings); U.S. Dep't of State,
Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1994, in 10 Terrorism: Documents of International and
Local Control 567, 648 (Howard S. Levie ed.. 1996) (reporting that 1006 casualties
resulted from international terrorist incidents in North America in 1993).
263. See Telephone Interview with Mark Pitcavage with the Anti-Defamation
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activity may be unearthed by applying the definition to reported
events. In December 1994, an anti-abortion protestor killed two clinic
receptionists and injured five during a two-day shooting spree of three
different clinics in Massachusetts and Virginia.264 The killings were
the outgrowth of "a violent, insurrectionary" anti-abortion movement
linked to seven murders and at least forty bombings and attacks of
abortion centers from 1993 to 1998.265 In other words, the spree was
one of numerous acts of anti-abortion terrorism. In March 1995, two
members of the anti-government Minnesota Patriots Council were
convicted for conspiracy to use ricin, an extremely deadly poison used
as a biological weapon.266 A speck of ricin can kill a person and it is
12,000 times more lethal than rattlesnake venom 67 In October 1995,
an Amtrak train was derailed, killing one person and seriously
injuring twelve, and a letter expressing outrage about Ruby Ridge,
Idaho and Waco, Texas attributed the incident to the "Sons of the
Gestapo."'  In merely the first six months after the Oklahoma City
bombing, there were six other near-incidents with right-wing
groups. 69
League (Nov. 17, 2000); Smith, supra note 232, at 5 (describing how criminologists
contend the term "terrorism" must include, among other acts, violations of human
rights and how scholars consider terrorist statistics "meaningless" because of the
government's problematic definition of "terrorism"); cf 1998 U.S. Terrorism Report,
supra note 24, at i ("There is no single, universally accepted, definition of
terrorism."). See supra note 226 for the FBI's definition of "terrorism."
264. John Kifner, Suspect in Clinic Killings Eludes Hunt But Is Caught in 3d Attack,
in Virginia, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1995, at 1. Supporters defended the actions of the
suspect, John Salvi, making such statements as: "We love you. We support you;"
"John Salvi was acting in defense of innocent life .... He was willing to pay the
ultimate price to stop legalized killing;" and "That [abortion clinic] was packed with
customers yesterday. It was justified." Chris Black, Alleged Killer Seen As Hero By
Activists Outside Va. Jail, Boston Globe, Jan. 2, 1995, at 8. John Salvi was ultimately
convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. John Ellement & Judy Rakowsky,
Salvi Found Dead in Prison Cell, Boston Globe, Nov. 30, 1996, at Al. Almost two
years after the attacks, he committed suicide in his jail cell. Id.
265. John Kifner, Finding a Common Foe, Fringe Groups Join Forces, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 6, 1998, at 3.
266. Dees, supra note 231, at 212. Ricin was also found on another man, Thomas
Lavy, who proved to have "survivalist" group connections. Id. at 211-12. After being
arrested in December 1993 by Canadian authorities, Lavy fled and was recaptured in
Arkansas in 1995. See id.
267. Id. at 211.
268. See Terrorist Research and Analytical Center, FBI, Terrorism in the United
States: 1995, in 13 Terrorism: Documents of International and Local Control 193, 199
(Donald J. Musch ed., 1997).
269. See Stern, supra note 3, at 251-53 (describing, inter alia, the arrest of an Aryan
Nation member possessing vials containing bubonic plague bacteria, the theft of five
hundred pounds of explosives from a mine, and a plot to blow up an IRS office
center).
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2. Terrorist Activity of Domestic Groups After AEDPA
Right-wing terrorist activity continued after April 1996, when
AEDPA was passed. In July 1996, the Justice Department uncovered
an Arizona militia group, the Arizona Vipers, that had made a video
depicting how to blow up several local buildings, including those for
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secret Service, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, the police, and the National
Guard.7 0 During arrests of the twelve suspects, authorities seized a
"witches' brew of explosives" and an "arsenal" of firearms and
ammunition.27 The suspects were eventually convicted for conspiracy
to make bombs and for weapons charges, receiving sentences of one
to nine years.2' At the end of July 1996, a bomb linked to right-wing
extremists exploded at the Atlanta Olympics, killing two and injuring
112 people.273
In October 1996, the FBI arrested seven West Virginia
Mountaineer Militia members for plotting to blow up a Bureau
fingerprinting facility and several other government buildings. ' The
group's leader, Floyd Looker, had agreed to sell blueprints of the
facility to an undercover agent posing as a broker for a Middle East
terrorist network. 5  The group had even considered assassinating
United States Senator Jay Rockefeller and Federal Reserve Chairman
Alan Greenspan in a "holy war" against the federal government.-"
Looker was ultimately sentenced to eighteen years in prison for
conspiring to manufacture and deal in explosives.?
In 1997, the FBI recorded two suspected acts of domestic terrorism
against presumable right-ving targets: the bombing of a women's
health facility and an "alternative lifestyle night club.""8 The Bureau
further prevented seven other acts of probable right-wing terrorism,
including the arrests of a group planning to engage United Nations
troops which they believed were stationed at an army base in Fort
Hood, Texas.279 The primary suspects, self-proclaimed "Brigadier
270. William Hermann et al., Vipers' Arsenal Is Seized, Ariz. Republic, July 3, 1996,
at Al.
271. Id.
272. 6 Militia Members Sentenced to Jail, The News and Observer (Raleigh, NC),
Mar. 20, 1997, at A8; 71-Month Sentence for Viper Militia Member, Chi. Trib., Apr. 3,
1997, at 8.
273. 1996 U.S. Terrorism Report, supra note 221, at 4; see infra note 282.
274. See David Johnston, 7 in Paramilitary Group Arrested in West Virginia, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 12, 1996, at A8.
275. Id.
276. FBI Documents Say a Militia Discussed Killing Greenspan, Chi. Trib., June 13,
1997, §1, at 15.
277. Militia Leader Gets 18-Year Sentence, Denies Bomb Plot, Chi. Trib., Mar. 29,
1998, at 8, available at LEXIS, News, Chicago Tribune.
278. 1997 U.S. Terrorism Report, supra note 220, at 3.
279. Id. at 4.
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General" Bradley Glover" ° and Michael Dorsett, were each
sentenced to five years.281
In 1998, the FBI recorded five incidents of domestic terrorism, one
of which was the bombing of a women's health clinic in Birmingham,
Alabama, linked to right-wing sources~m The Bureau was further
involved in preventing twelve incidents of terrorism by domestic
groups.23 The most prominent case involved several members of the
white supremacist group "The New Order" who plotted to commit
numerous crimes, including killing the founder of the Southern
Poverty Law Center, poisoning the water supply of East St. Louis as a
diversion for a bank robbery, and attacking the New York office of a
Jewish social service organization.' Four defendants were sentenced
to prison.2
C. The Unjust Origins of AEDPA
In the face of a burgeoning homegrown terrorist movement, the
United States directed its most public antiterrorism measure at
international groups. No American groups connected to terrorism
were subject to AEDPA's foreign-oriented antiterrorist provisions.
To understand the reasons this may have happened, this section
examines society's prejudice against Arabs and illustrates the racism
that was bound to affect the nation's response to terrorism. Further, it
suggests that the unconscious racism of society may potentially affect
prosecutors' decisions in investigating Arab suspects.
Some commentators suggest that the government's reaction to
Oklahoma City, as embodied in AEDPA, was inextricably tied to
racism, whether unconscious or conscious.286 The unjustified attention
280. Id.
281. See Man Given 5-Year Term for Plot on Fort Hood, Austin-Am.-Statesman,
Jan. 8. 1999, at B3 (Bradley Glover); Bomb Suspect Sentenced, Hous. Chron., Oct. 30,
1998, at 38A (Michael Dorsett).
282. 1998 U.S. Terrorism Report, supra note 24, at 3. The report tied the bombing
to Eric Rudolph and the Army of God, who were connected to the July 1996 bombing
of Atlanta's Centennial Park during the Summer Olympics, the January 1997
bombing of an Atlanta abortion clinic, and the February 1997 bombing of an Atlanta
"alternative lifestyle" club. Id.
283. Id. at 5-7.
284. Id. at 5.
285. Supplier to Supremacists Gets 2 Years, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Nov. 24, 1998,
at B2. The column reported that all but one of five suspects had been sentenced to
prison. Id. No subsequent newspaper reports were available providing the outcome
of the fifth suspect's trial.
286. Kenneth Stern offered a compelling consideration:
Pretend for a moment that the militias had been mostly black; now imagine
how fast [congressional] hearings into them would have been convened after
[the Oklahoma City bombing].... If you don't think that the color of the
alleged bombers' skin and of the groups to which they were linked was the
key factor for many politicians, recall the first days after the bombing, when
the media assumed that Islamic terrorists were guilty. Even those public
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directed at Arab and Muslim terrorists is consistent with anti-Arab
bias that has permeated society. It is exhibited within the general
population, law enforcement, and the media. Anti-Arab sentiment
was evident during the 1979 hostage crisis and prominently re-
emerged during the Persian Gulf conflict in 1990-911' despite the fact
that the United States was allied with many Arab nations including
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. Indeed,
serious hate crimes against Arabs-assaults, arsons, and bombings-
increased from thirty-nine in 1990 to 119 in 1991."' More generally,
scores of Arabs were subject to threats and harassment, vandalism
was directed against Arabs at least fifteen times, and there were, at a
minimum, two shootings.'
The WTC bombing by Islamic extremists again tainted Arabs. A
1993 poll found that Islam was the "least-favored of all religions in
America."'290 Anti-Arab sentiment appeared in areas far from New
York City: Los Angeles, San Diego, Cleveland, and Raleigh, North
Carolina.29' Politicians were accused of rushing to unjustly blame
Arabs. Sixteen Christian religious groups wrote to Congress, "We are
alarmed by the ease with which... Islam[] is cited as the factor that
distinguishes, motivates and funds the men accused of the WTC
bombing as well as many of the perpetrators of violence in Middle
Eastern countries. '' 292 Specifically, they criticized immigration
proposals that would "abet religious and ethnic stereotyping of
Muslims and Arabs." '293
Such anti-Arab sentiment was reflected in statements made by
Senator Frank R. Lautenberg when he learned of the connection one
officials who did not scapegoat Islam argued that the ideological system that
gave license to "the bombers" should be condemned [whereas they did not
do so when militia groups were implicated].
See Stem, supra note 3, at 211.
287. See Duke, supra note 194.
288. Deborah Sontag, Muslims in the United States Fear an Upsurge in Hostility,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1993, at Al (citing statistics provided by the ADC).
289. See American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 1991 Report on Anti-
Arab Hate Crimes: Political and Hate Violence Against Arab-Americans 11-22
(1992) (on file with the Fordtam Law Review).
290. Michael Katz, Poll Says Islam Least-Favored U.S. Religion; Muslims Blame
Media, Chi. Trib., Apr. 9, 1993, §1, at 6.
291. See American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, Hate Crimes Against
Arab-Americans and American Muslims in the Wake of the World Trade Center
Bombing 2 (Mar. 1993) (on file with the Fordham Law Review); Barbara Kingsley,
Muslims Tell Lawmaker of Prejudice Concerns, Plain Dealer (Cleveland), Apr. 13,
1993, at 6B. For example, a mosque in Kent, Ohio received a phone call promising to
"get" Muslims in retaliation for the WTC bombing. Id. Similarly, a Cleveland Islamic
Center received threatening calls. Id.
292. Congress Urged to Avoid Casting Suspicion on Arabs, Orlando Sentinel, Apr.
10, 1993, at B6 (internal quotes omitted).
293. Id. (internal quotes omitted).
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suspect charged with the bombing had with "violent Moslem
fundamentalist groups."
These reports must serve as a clarion call for the concerted effort, in
conjunction with other nations, to investigate, to identify, and to
root out groups who, under the banner of Islam, perpetrate violence
throughout the world and operate as enemies of peace and
stability.... [T]his brutal bombing against innocent American
civilians, on U.S. territory, makes one thing crystal clear: If the long
arm of Middle East terrorist groups can strike at Americans hard at
work [at] the World Trade Center in Manhattan, then no American
is safe.294
Although he immediately added that a "majority" of Muslims reject
terrorism, the disclaimer was weak because a mere majority does not
preclude a large minority of Muslims from being terrorists.295
Furthermore, his dispassionate disclaimer could not remove the
stigma attached by his previously heated language. A previous
warning by Senator Orrin Hatch not to stoke anti-Arab bias suggested
that the Senate had already seen other such heated statements.296
A comparison of Senator Lautenberg's oratory with the measured
words of Senator Thomas Daschle after two American suspects were
arrested for the Oklahoma City bombing shows a revealing contrast.
It is imperative that we find ways for Americans from diverse
backgrounds with sometimes very divergent points of view to live
harmoniously.
The first step toward that goal is for us to talk to each other....
If we listen to one another, we are likely to find our differences are
not as great as some of the intemperate rhetoric makes them
appear....
The bombing in Oklahoma City is the result of evil, misguided
people. We do not yet know what their motivation was; we can only
speculate. But we can ask ourselves if our increasingly hateful public
294. 139 Cong. Rec. 4312 (1993) (emphases added).
295. See id. ("Clearly, the majority of Moslems in the United States reject this cult
of terrorists. One's religion is no mark of one's politics. The Moslems of this Nation
certainly do not support violence against fellow Americans and others.").
296. See 139 Cong. Rec. 4477 (1993). Senator Orrin Hatch cautioned:
In the case of the World Trade Center bombing, we again must beware of
those who would condemn all Arab-Americans for the actions of a few
scurrilous and cruel individuals.... Americans must not hold all Arabs or
Moslems responsible for the World Trade Center bombing simply because
the principal suspect happens to be an Arab.
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discourse is falling on ears receptive to hate, if it is providing a contert
for hands ready to undertake hatefid acts. 297
Senator Daschle urged the nation to understand the environment that
encouraged Timothy McVeigh to kill 168 people; he did not invoke a
"clarion call" to fight right-wing extremists. He isolated McVeigh as
the cause of the bombing and did not blame his ideology or political
beliefs; McVeigh was not placed under the "banner" of militia
extremists. The speech assuaged public anxiety about militia groups;
it did not foment public fear that the "long arm" of right-wing
extremism can strike at anyone if it can strike at Oklahoma. Indeed,
the Senator suggested there may be collective blame.'z
Oklahoma City led to more backlash against Arabs. A "wave of
anti-Moslem, anti-Arab hysteria" immediately followed the bombing
as many experts and media linked the bombing to Islamic groups.'
In the first three days after the Oklahoma City bombing, 222 attacks
against Muslims were recorded3' even though the Caucasian
American suspect Timothy McVeigh was linked to the bombing
within two days.0 1 Attacks included spitting at women, death threats,
gunshots at mosques, and a fake bomb thrown at a child day care
center.302 At schools and universities, Muslim and Arab students were
subject to harassment.3 3 Arab Muslims around the United States
grew keenly aware of the pervasive anti-Arab sentiment.'
Such bias was also evident in law enforcement and among terrorist
experts. On the day of the Oklahoma City bombing, the FBI
297. 141 Cong. Rec. 11,197 (1995) (emphases added); see also 141 Cong. Rec.
11,185 (1995) (reporting Senator James M. Inhofe's statement that "[tihe bombing in
my State was not the work of the left or the right, of conservatives or liberals,
Republicans or Democrats, or even right-wing extremists, as some people would
say").
298. Of course, the terrorist act of a fellow American may naturally require more
understanding than one by an outsider because such a source of violence has
developed and lived, and may continue to live, among us. Nevertheless, Senator
Lautenberg's words stigmatized an entire group while Caucasian perpetrators were
treated with circumspection. Moreover, consider that while 168 people were killed by
McVeigh, only 5 were killed by the Arab group.
299. See 141 Cong. Rec. 11,940 (1995) [hereinafter Senator Abraham Statement]
(reporting the statement of Senator Spencer Abraham), Stern, supra note 3, at 182-83.
300. James Brooke, Attacks on U.S. Muslims Surge Even as Their Faith Takes
Hold, N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 1995, at Al.
301. See John Kifner, Authorities Hold a Man of 'Ertreme Right-Wing Views', N.Y.
Times, Apr. 22, 1995, at 9.
302. Brooke, supra note 300.
303. Senator Abraham Statement, supra note 299.
304. See, e.g., Emily M. Bernstein, Fear About Retaliation Among Muslin Groups,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1995, at A26 (quoting an Arab Muslim in Oklahoma who feared
anti-Arab bias); Michael Grumwald, Muslins Fear Being Made Scapegoats, Boston
Globe, Apr. 21, 1995, at 1 (Muslims in Boston); Don Lattin, Muslims, Others Feel
Scapegoated by Speculation, S.F. Chron., Apr. 20. 1995, at All (Muslims in San
Francisco).
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immediately focused on Arabs" 5 as did the Pentagon.3 6 The special
agent in charge of the Oklahoma FBI readily dismissed a tie to the
Branch Davidians, merely calling it an "obvious coincidence" that the
bombing's date marked the two-year anniversary of the Waco
confrontation. 3°' Former CIA and FBI director, William Webster,
said the bombing had the "hallmarks" of Middle East terrorism.0 8
Another former CIA official urged, in The Boston Globe, that "[t]he
foreign supporters must be identified. '39  The editor of a Middle
East-related periodical declared that the West was "under attack. '310
He warned, "People need to understand that this is just the beginning.
The fundamentalists are on the upsurge, and they make it very clear
that they are targeting us. They are absolutely obsessed with us."'31' A
former congressman, within hours of the bombing, discussed on CBS
television the "very clear evidence" that linked "fundamentalist
Islamic terrorist groups" to the bombing. 312
Law enforcement's dragnet immediately fell upon Arabs. A
"suspicious Jordanian-American man" was apprehended by London
authorities and turned over to "an army of federal agents" the day
after the bombing.313 The man raised suspicion because he had flown
from Oklahoma City and had telephone equipment in his luggage. 31 4
305. See Arnold Hamilton, Terror: Oklahoma City Car Bomb Kills at Least 31,
Dallas Morning News, Apr. 20, 1995, at 1A. The article described an FBI
communiqu6 which stated: "'We are currently inclined to suspect the Islamic Jihad as
the likely group ... ' Id.; see also Jere Hester & Dave Eisenstadt, Terror Blast Kills
Scores: Suspects Spotted in Texas, Daily News (N.Y.), Apr. 20, 1995, at 2 (quoting a
"top FBI official" who stated, "'[a]s of right now, we are focusing on Muslim
terrorism"' because the Oklahoma City bombing was almost "exactly the same"
method as that in the WTC bombing).
306. See Peter Copeland, Experts Say Attack Reveals Vulnerability, Rocky Mtn.
News (Denv.), Apr. 20, 1995, at 4A. A Pentagon official assured people that their
reaction was "'not business as usual"' and that "'[aIll the national intelligence
agencies are spinning up and dredging through everything they have."' Id. Pentagon
involvement strongly suggested concern with a foreign threat, that is, international
terrorists.
307. See Hamilton, supra note 305.
308. See Sam Vincent Meddis, Oklahoma Learns "No Place Is Safe", USA Today,
Apr. 20, 1995, at 1A (internal quotes omitted).
309. Vincent M. Cannistraro, Editorial, Evening Up the Books?, Boston Globe,
Apr. 21, 1995, at 23. The editorial's author was a former CIA chief of
counterterrorism. Id.
310. Meddis, supra note 308 (internal quotes omitted) (quoting Daniel Pipes,
editor of the Middle East Quarterly).
311. Id. (internal quotes omitted) (quoting Daniel Pipes).
312. Walter Goodman, Wary Network Anchors Battle Dubious Scoops, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 20, 1995, at B12 (internal quotes omitted) (quoting former representative
Dave McCurdy).
313. Helen Kennedy, Wanted; Global Manhunt Targets 2 in Okla. Bombing,
Boston Herald, Apr. 21, 1995, at 1, available at LEXIS, News, The Boston Herald.
314. Id. While no explanation was given for the reason telephone equipment may
have raised suspicions, one may surmise that such equipment may appear similar to,
or be used in, bomb equipment.
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In another case, three Arab men asking for directions from an
Oklahoma Highway Patrol officer somehow raised his suspicion,
prompting him to investigate their license plate number,315 which had
been illegally switched from a rental car. The three men were
arrested316 and one was immediately identified as a suspect.317
Such law enforcement treatment of Arabs started in the late
1960s, 18 persisted into the 1970s and 1980s,319 and grew prominent in
the early 1990s when, for example, federal agents initiated questioning
of Arab residents in Texas, California, New York, Arkansas, and
Ohio.32 ° With the onset of the Persian Gulf war, the FBI began
targeting "in earnest" the Arab community.321 Confronting Arabs
throughout the nation, the FBI and some local officials questioned
people about their political viewpoints, opinions about Saddam
Hussein, and attitudes concerning Israel and United States Middle
East policy.322 The FBI reportedly continued its surveillance of
certain Arab communities after the war.3 23 A Brooklyn mosque was
monitored by FBI agents in March 1993, and the surveillance resulted
in the arrest of three Arab men for a cause unrelated to terrorism. 24
The news media fostered such public prejudice, in part, by
emphasizing connections between terrorists and Arabs or Muslims
when it would not do so for non-Arab groups . 2  Furthermore, it
reinforced stereotypes by associating Arab peoples with negative
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id.; see also Bomb Rocks Federal Building in Oklahoma, Chi. Trib., Apr. 19,
1995, at 1.
318. See James G. Abourezk, Arab-Americans Suffering with Guilt by Unfair
Association, Buff. News, May 2, 1993, at H10. Former Senator Abourezk described
FBI harassment of a Palestinian American woman who hosted a group of West Bank
mayors touring the United States. Id. The FBI did not investigate the Minneapolis
mayor who co-hosted with her. Id. Sen. Abourezk also recounted FBI harassment,
which "most likely" included burglarization, impersonation, and threats of an Arab
American attorney who was the plaintiff in a 1972 American Civil Liberties Union
lawsuit. Id.
319. See Dempsey & Cole, supra note 6, at 44-46 (detailing the FBI's nationwide
monitoring of the non-criminal conduct of a Palestinian student organization, the
General Union of Palestinian Students, from 1979 to 1989).
320. See id. at 42-44.
321. Akram, supra note 11, at 52 n.5.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Sontag, supra note 288. The agents checked the license plate of one car and
discovered it was stolen. Id. Although they arrested the three Arab American men,
the suspects were later released. Id.
325. Wiley Hall III, Arab-Americans: Rush to Judgment, Times-Picayune (New
Orleans), Apr. 28, 1995, at B7 [hereinafter Hall, Rush to Judgment] ("[T]he major
media outlets have been very careful not to unfairly link all angry white men, or even
all right-wing extremists, to the Oklahoma City bombing."); Betty Liu Ebron, U.S.
Arabs, Muslims Allege Bias, Dallas Morning News, Mar. 14, 1993, at 37A (noting that
the media will emphasize an Arab connection to terrorism but will not do so for a
Christian or Jewish group).
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attributes.326  In 1993, two prominent and otherwise respected
publications portrayed shockingly stereotypical and insulting images
of Arabs. The New Yorker magazine depicted a scene on a July 1993
magazine cover where three children, one Caucasian, one Hispanic,
one African, were building an elaborate sandcastle which is destroyed
by a fourth child wearing Arab headdress.327 The Washington Post ran
a cartoon titled, "Let's Play Where's Abu" and challenged the reader
to find among a throng of immigrants "the terrorist Abu Ben Fotwa
El Fadwa El Fatweh [who] is carrying a huge bomb strapped to his
waist. "328 Even Disney was accused of encouraging anti-Arab
prejudice with the lyrics from its movie "Aladdin. 3 29  Two
Congressmen unambiguously stated their concerns in the House of
Representatives about such ethnic stereotyping.33 ° Representative
David E. Bonior asserted that "[a]nti-Arab bias is very real-it is
prevalent in our television programs, newspapers, and, yes, our
magazines. "331
The Oklahoma City tragedy provided another occasion to tarnish
and stigmatize Arabs. The media may have been objective when it
reported investigative updates about possible suspects,332 but it
inexplicably continued focusing on an Arab link after two Caucasians,
possibly white supremacists, were identified as primary suspects.333
326. See Moustafa Bayoumi, Letter to the Editor, Don't Let Trade Center Blast
Ignite Witch Hunt, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1993, at A22 (criticizing the newspaper's
description on March 5 of a bombing suspect as having a "beakish nose" and "hollow
cheeks").
327. See Porras, supra note 192, at 134.
328. See 139 Cong. Rec. 18,246 (1993) (reporting the statement of Representative
David E. Bonior discussing media coverage of the Arab community).
329. Id. The lyrics that appeared in the movie theater version of "Aladdin" sang:
Oh, I come from a land
From a faraway place
Where the caravan camels roam.
Where they cut off your ear
If they don't like your face
It's barbaric, but hey, it's home.
Id. Disney ultimately removed the fourth and fifth lines. Id.
330. See id. (reporting the statements of Representatives David E. Bonior and John
Dingell discussing media coverage of the Arab community).
331. Id.
332. See, e.g., Hester & Eisenstadt, supra note 305 (reporting the FBI was seeking
three men of Middle Eastern descent); Michael Taylor & Louis Freedberg, Timing
and Method Put Focus on Militant Groups, S.F. Chron., Apr. 20, 1995, at A13
("[E]xperts immediately pointed to the timing of the attack-which appeared
calculated to maximize carnage -as a signature of Muslim terrorists who have carried
out similar bombings.").
333. See Mimi Hall, Arab-Americans Once Again Targets, USA Today, Apr. 21,
1995, at 3A (describing that a Middle Eastern tie was "a notion replayed again and
again in media reports" after arrest warrants for two white men were issued); see, e.g.,
Editorial, Striking Back, Wash. Times, Apr. 21, 1995, at A22 (arguing that an
international group would likely be behind the bombing and that the United States
must pay particular attention to Middle Eastern terrorism, which is "most likely to
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One troubling example of anti-Arab sentiment in the media occurred
on a WABC radio talk show discussing the Oklahoma City bombing.
The host, responding to a caller who cautioned against a rush to blame
Muslims, exclaimed, "What I would like to do is put you up against
the wall with the rest of them, and mow you down along with them-
execute you with them."3" Another radio host requested from his
listeners: "Tell me what you'd like to do with these towelheads."3 35
At least one reporter acknowledged the news media's anti-Arab
inclination when he wrote, "In hindsight ... our first suspicions should
not have fallen on Arab Americans but on angry young white men."'
Popular opinion mirrored the media's perspective. A USA Today
poll after the bombing indicated the social climate was ripe to direct
society's ire against foreigners and, perhaps, make Arabs scapegoats.
Increased surveillance of foreigners in America was supported by 63
percent while surveillance of American citizens was only supported by
37 percent.337
Such a society was not only more likely to unreasonably apprehend
an Arab terrorist threat, as compared to a domestic threat, but it was
also more likely to have prosecutors and investigators, as fellow
members of society, who share such sentiment. As a result, the
criminal proceedings against the Oklahoma City and WTC-related
suspects may possibly have exaggerated the Arab terrorist vis-A-vis
the militia terrorist threat. While prosecutors ultimately convicted a
wide-reaching "jihad organization"3-- of almost twenty people
somehow connected to the WTC bombing,33 only two lone
Americans in the Oklahoma City bombing were convicted. The
respective results reinforced what anti-Arab bias had predisposed
society to believe: foreign elements were the threat. Consequently,
Congress' antiterrorism response may have been a response only to
the more dangerously perceived terrorist source.
target the United States", despite a cover article and graphic about the two primary
Caucasian suspects); Kennedy, supra note 313 (focusing approximately one-half of
the article on Muslim suspects despite reporting the investigation's "big break" in
identifying two Caucasian suspects and noting that no claims of responsibility by
Muslim groups had been taken seriously by law enforcement).
334. Brooke, supra note 300.
335. Grumwald, supra note 304.
336. Hall, Rush to Judgment, supra note 325. Hall noted in retrospect that the
Republican revolution in the 1994 elections, the membership growth in anti-
government groups, and the fact that April 19 was the anniversary of the Waco, Texas
showdown were factors that should have led the public away from suspecting Arabs.
Id.
337. Andrea Stone & Tom Squitieri, Bomb Forces Question: How Safe Are We?,
USA Today, Apr. 21, 1995, at 1A.
338. Richard Bernstein, U.S. Portrays Sheik as Head of a Wide Terrorist Netvork,
N.Y. Times, May 6, 1994, at Al.
339. In addition to the six men convicted for the WTC bombing, thirteen others
were convicted for a broader conspiracy to bomb various New York City sites (of
which the WTC had been one). See supra text accompanying notes 206, 213. 215.
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If society's racism is typically "unconscious" and hidden, rather than
conscious and overt,"4° and law enforcement personnel are members
of that same society, law enforcement may likely be unconsciously
racist to at least some extent. Thus, when one considers the broad
discretion granted to prosecutors,341 it is quite possible that
government investigations may either overestimate the threat posed
by foreigners or underestimate the threat posed by citizens, and allot
resources accordingly.342 As a result, they may collect more evidence
to ensure a broad-reaching prosecution and successful conviction. 3
For example, consider that the FBI had started monitoring the
WTC-related group in 1989, four years before the defendants were
ultimately arrested.344 This was long before the 1993 WTC bombing
by four associates would draw attention to their group. In 1991, the
government first infiltrated the group with an undercover
informant.3"s His work provided prosecutors with hundreds of hours
of secretly recorded video and audio tapes, evidence upon which the
government's terror conspiracy indictments "relied heavily."-' 6
Moreover, consider the seniority of government officials involved in
the WTC investigation. President Bill Clinton was briefed, in
advance, on the raids to arrest the terror conspiracy suspects. 347
Attorney General Janet Reno was significantly involved in delaying
arrest of the group's leader, Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, to ensure
enough evidence was compiled against him and, more generally, to
continue surveillance of "Islamic extremism." 38  Indeed, she, along
with United States Attorney Mary Jo White, withstood heavy
criticism for steadfastly gathering evidence and not simply arresting
him.349 The decision to ultimately arrest Rahman was made by top
340. See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
341. See Margaret E. McGhee, Prosecutorial Discretion, 88 Geo. L.J. 1057, 1058-60
(2000) ("A prosecutor has far-reaching authority to decide whether to investigate,....
to determine whether to bring charges, what charges to bring, when to bring charges,
and where to bring charges.").
342. Note, Developments in the Law-Race and the Criminal Process, 101 Harv. L.
Rev. 1472, 1522 (1988) [hereinafter Developments in the Law] (noting the broad
discretion given to prosecutors in the "screening stage").
343. See id. at 1524.
344. Appellee Brief, supra note 201, at 17-18 (describing FBI surveillance of the
group in July 1989).
345. The undercover informant was a former Egyptian soldier who was involved
with the group for two periods: from the fall of 1991 through July 1992, and then from
March 1993 through the June 1993 arrests. See Appellee Brief, supra note 201, at 33-
34, 46, 70, 174.
346. Tabor, supra note 208.
347. Robert D. McFadden, 8 Seized as Suspects in Plot to Bomb New York Targets
and Kill Political Figures, N.Y. Times, June 25, 1993, at Al.
348. David Johnston, Reno Sees Growing Evidence and Makes Call, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 26, 1993, at B4.
349. See id. Then-Senator Alfonse D'Amato was among Reno's harshest critics,
particularly because he apparently was an assassination target. See id.
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Justice Department officials.3-0  To the extent that the Justice
Department may also be affected by conscious or unconscious racism,
it is not unlikely that Arab suspects would be prosecuted differently
than domestic Caucasian suspects. 351
Arabs have committed few acts of domestic terrorism since 1983,352
while domestic groups have been the cause of almost all terrorism on
American soil." 3  Considering these facts and society's anti-Arab
sentiment, one must conclude that AEDPA's focus on Arabs was
unwarranted by terrorist trends and rooted, at least in part, in an
entrenched racist impulse.3 4  The following part will illustrate the
subsequent effects AEDPA has had on the Arab community.
III. AEDPA's STIGMATIZATION OF ARABS AND
THE NEED FOR SOLUTIONS
This part will demonstrate that AEDPA has stigmatized the Arab
community and, thus, the legislation violates equal justice. The
enforcement of AEDPA has directly stigmatized Arabs in its almost
exclusive enforcement against the Arab community and the harshness
of its application. As a result, AEDPA implicitly justifies societal
discrimination against Arabs, which has been manifest in treatment by
government agencies, individuals, and business entities. This part
therefore proposes solutions to the problem of unequal justice and
argues that every American has a fundamental interest in ensuring
equal justice for Arab residents and for all.
A. Application of AEDPA Against Arabs
AEDPA's impact has been disproportionately felt by Arabs in its
designation of foreign terrorist organizations, the application of the
fundraising prohibition, and the authorization of secret evidence.3 55
By issuing a list of foreign terrorist organizations of which half are
Arab or Muslim groups,356 the government has branded them in public
as the United States' primary terrorist threat. By definition, no
domestic extreme right-wing group can fall within the "foreign"
terrorist group designation. The Ku Klux Klan may be a hate group,
but that denotes its members as "haters" or "racists." Hamas, and
thirteen other Arab groups, have been officially branded terrorism
groups, which not only labels members as "terrorists"-a more
350. See id.
351. While this issue is beyond the scope of this Note, it should be considered when
evaluating the respective threats uncovered by the WTC and Oklahoma City
investigations.
352. See discussion supra Part II.A.
353. See discussion supra Part II.B.
354. See discussion supra Part II.C.
355. See discussion supra Part I.C.
356. See supra text accompanying note 21.
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pejorative term than "hater" or "racist"-but also subjects them,
almost exclusively, to AEDPA's other harsh provisions. In applying
the fundraising prohibition, the government has subjected numerous
Arab and Muslim groups to intense scrutiny and inhibited their ability
to legitimately contribute to charity, burdens which are not
proportionately imposed by AEDPA against other ethnic groups.
357
Through the use of secret evidence almost exclusively against Arabs
and Muslims, the government degrades each individual, dispirits his or
her family, and suggests to the surrounding community that Arabs are
so dangerous that they are unworthy of our most basic constitutional
protections.
1. Designating "Foreign Terrorist Organizations"
Although Arab groups may be a publicly prominent cause of
violence or terrorism abroad,358 AEDPA was intended to prevent the
terrorism on American soil that Oklahoma City painfully
represented.3 59  Nevertheless, it publicly brands only international
groups based on two vague criteria that are subject to limited judicial
review: (1) whether they engage in terrorist activity and (2) if such
activity threatens the nation or its citizens.36 Groups like the
American Front Skinheads, the Arizona Vipers, the West Virginia
Mountaineer Militia, and other right-wing groups that have
committed or plotted terrorist violence in the United States meet this
criteria,361 yet AEDPA does not officially brand them as terrorist
threats or subject them to any such constitutionally suspect
restrictions.362 Although some may argue that domestic groups should
have more constitutional protections than international groups, the
mere disproportionate impact of AEDPA on Arabs creates a critical
problem with regard to racism in the United States. By failing to label
domestic groups as a terrorist danger, the government enhances the
perceived dangerousness of international groups.
The government further supported the notion that Arabs are the
most dangerous threat to the nation by identifying Arab and Muslim
groups as fourteen of the twenty-eight most dangerous terrorist
organizations.363  The fourteen non-Arab and non-Muslim groups
represent eight disparate nationalities from South America, Europe,
and Asia.3" Notably, the government failed to include the Irish
357. See infra text accompanying notes 373-74.
358. See supra text accompanying notes 134, 224.
359. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
360. See discussion supra Part I.C.2.
361. See supra text accompanying notes 259, 270-85.
362. By definition the pertinent AEDPA provisions are directed at, and implicate
only, foreign groups. They do not affect domestic groups.
363. See supra note 21.
364. See supra note 21.
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Republican Army ("IRA") in its list. In fact, three Senators attacked
the IRA's absence when the initial foreign terrorist organization list
was released in 1997.36
The State Department explained it did not so designate the IRA
because of the group's recent cease-fire and peace negotiations.- '
Palestinian groups, however, remained on the list under the umbrella
of the Palestinian Liberation Organization ("PLO") even though the
PLO had entered peace talks with Israel and concluded three peace
agreements.3 67  Although no IRA terrorism has recently touched
United States soil, the same may be said for the activities of any of the
Palestinian groups.3" Nevertheless, the IRA is able to continue
raising money in the United States, while Palestinian groups are not.
2. Prohibiting Material Support
The singling out of Arabs under AEDPA is compounded by the
enforcement of AEDPA against any party suspected of contributing
to terrorist groups, even for their many non-violent activities.'
Under AEDPA, anyone who attempts to give material support or
resources to a designated terrorist organization may be imprisoned for
ten years and fined at least $50,000. 310 The first charge for providing
"material support" was brought in 1998 against Fawzi Mustapha
Assi.371 Indeed, in 1998 alone, the FBI was investigating at least
twenty Muslim groups in the United States.3 - Although other groups
have been examined, 73 the government admits that its focus is on
365. Jacqueline Benson, Comment, Send Me Your MoneY: Controlling
International Terrorism by Restricting Fundraising in the United States, 21 Hous. J.
Int'l L. 321, 347 (1998) (describing the opposition of Senators John Kyl, Dianne
Feinstein, and Jesse Helms). Senator Jesse Helms questioned the State Department's
decision because the United States Embassy in London was a -medium threat" risk.
Press Release, Senator Jesse Helms, Helms Letter to President Urging Designation of
IRA as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (Oct. 21, 1997), available at LEXIS. FDCH
Congressional Press Releases. He attributed the risk level to the embassy's concerns
about the IRA, particularly in light of the group's seventeen terrorist acts beginning
in 1991, which included mortar attacks on airplanes at Heathrow Airport and an
attempted assassination of British Prime Minister John Major. See id.
366. See Benson, supra note 365, at 347 n.168.
367. Akram, supra note 11, at 71 n.116.
368. See Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, supra note 21
(promulgating the most recent list of foreign terrorist organizations); 1998 U.S.
Terrorism Report, supra note 24, at 23-24 (describing all terrorism incidents in the
United States for 1990-1998).
369. See supra text accompanying note 153.
370. See supra text accompanying notes 152-54.
371. John Mintz & Michael Grunwald, FBI Terror Probes Focus on U.S. Muslims:
Expanded Investigations, New Tactics Stir Allegations of Persecution, Wash. Post, Oct.
31, 1998, at Al. Assi was monitored for five months before being charged. Id. (noting
the FBI started monitoring Assi in February 1998 and charged him after a July 1998
airport stop). He was ultimately released on bail and fled to Lebanon. Id.
372. Id.
373. See id. (describing investigations of Puerto Rican, Irish, and Spanish groups).
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Muslim groups,374 which debilitates Arab Americans in two manners.
First, Arabs themselves sense the almost paranoid view the
government has of their group.375 As a result, there is a "chilling
effect" on the First Amendment activity of Arab groups intimidating
them into curtailing their speech and restricting their associations. 76
Second, the surrounding non-Arab community is arguably influenced
by, and perhaps ultimately subscribes to, such paranoia as it either
witnesses the questioning and scrutiny by authorities or hears of such
treatment in the media, whether or not the charges are ever actually
proven true.377 The government's selective enforcement of this
provision of AEDPA accentuates the stigma against Arabs and sends
a discriminatory message to the community.
In contrast, two Israeli foreign terrorist organizations, Kach and
Kahane Chai (collectively, "Kahane"), have raised money apparently
unobstructed by AEDPA.378 In Israel, the groups have been outlawed
for their "Arab-hating" ideology since 1994, the same year a Kahane
supporter shot twenty-nine Muslims to death while they prayed in a
mosque.379 Kahane was considered "a cult of violence and racism"
374. Id. ("[O]fficials acknowledge that their main focus is on Muslim individuals
and groups.").
375. See, e.g., Gordon Trowbridge & Lama Bakri, Local Arabs Fear Fed Scrutiny,
Detroit News, July 25, 2000, at 1A (quoting a local Arab leader commenting on the
arrests of some Arab American men suspected of fundraising for a Lebanese terrorist
group: "'It's intimidating. It seems like the Arab community has been singled out');
Teresa Watanabe & Eric Lichtblau, FBI Accused of Terror Overreaction: Muslims
Claim They Were Singled Out for Questioning in the Federal Effort to Squelch
Millennium-Related Terrorism; Agents Deny Bias, L.A. Times, Jan. 10, 2000, at BI
(quoting a California Islamic fundraiser who was questioned by FBI agents about
whether she knew an Algerian man arrested in Seattle allegedly trying to enter the
United States with explosives: "'Who do they think we are? ... That we Muslims have
a terrorist in every family? Sometimes it just gets ridiculous."').
376. Dempsey & Cole, supra note 6, at 11. To illustrate the effect a government
fundraising investigation can have on a suspect's life, consider the treatment of one
subject who was investigated by the government under an Executive Order with
"similar effect," id. at 141, as AEDPA:
FBI agents tail him everywhere and question people he meets. In June,
prosecutors filed an unprecedented "forfeiture complaint" seizing his bank
accounts and taking steps to remove him, his wife.... and their four young
children from their house....
Now... the Salah family is living on donated food. Salah is no longer
allowed to have financial dealings-including with his lawyer and his
doctor-unless they obtain special Treasury Department licenses.
Mintz & Grunwald, supra note 371.
377. See, e.g., David Firestone, Possible Terrorist Links Sting Quiet Neighborhood,
N.Y. Times, July 24, 2000, at A10; William Gaines & Andrew Martin, Terror-Funding
Probe Touches Suburban Group, Chi. Trib., Sept. 8. 1998, at 1; Judith Miller & Riva
D. Atlas, Citibank Weighs Ending Ties with an Arab Bank: Asks Treasury Department
for Guidance, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 2001, at C2; Judith Miller, U.S. Contends Muslim
Charity Is Tied to Hamas, N.Y. Times, Aug. 25,2000, at A21.
378. See Dean E. Murphy, Terror Label No Hindrance to Anti-Arab Jewish Group,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 2000, at Al.
379. See id.
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and remains potentially dangerous although its support has shrunk.'
Nevertheless, the organization freely and publicly fundraises in the
United States.38' They avoid authorities by simply changing
organizational names, suggesting that Kahane is subject to minimal
scrutiny by federal authorities.' Kahane's Brooklyn leader stated
that law enforcement officials consider them "nice people" and leave
the group alone. 83 Indeed, federal authorities allowed the leader of
Kach to enter and travel around the United States for a speaking tour
during which he would attend a $35,000 New York fundraiser?.
Justified or not, such apparent indifference by authorities indicates to
the public that this terrorist group is not dangerous and avoids
stigmatizing Israelis or Jews.
Particularly problematic for domestic Arab groups is that a number
of overseas terrorist sponsors also fund religious and charitable
projects.385 Hamas operates "orphanages, old-age homes, hospitals,
women's clinics, religious colleges, sports clubs, kindergartens and
vocational schools" in addition to a match-making service.' The
group provides irreplaceable benefits to "tens of thousands" of
indigent Palestinians.' Indeed, Hamas arguably provides more
charitable services to Palestinians than their own governmental entity,
the Palestinian Authority.' Another "foreign terrorist organization,"
Hezbollah, operates three hospitals, nine schools, and thirteen dental
clinics while also "provid[ing] drinking water to Beirut slums and
rebuild[ing] roads and houses destroyed [by] fighting."-"
No Arab in America can financially contribute to such worthwhile
endeavors undertaken by such prominent and influential groups.",'
380. See id. (internal quotes omitted).
381. The article described a Brooklyn fundraising dinner for 350 attendees who will
pay one hundred dollars apiece to a fund which supports pro-Kahane causes. Id. One
of the group's leaders stated, "'We operate openly and have nothing to hide."' Id.
382. See id
383. Id.
384. See id. In apparent incredulity, an Islamic group spokesman, Ibrahim Hooper,
commented: "'Can you imagine the outcry if both the head of Hamas and Hezbollah
went on a speaking tour of America?' Id.
385. See U.S. Seizes Cleric's Possessions in Uganda Bomb Plot Inquiry, Dallas
Morning News, Sept. 24, 1998, at 15A, available at LEXIS, News, The Dallas Morning
News ("A number of Middle Eastern organizations that have sponsored terrorism,
including the Palestine Liberation Organization, Hezbollah, Hamas and a variety of
Iranian foundations, also have funded charitable and religious projects.").
386. Deborah Horan, Terrorists Maintain Foothold in Palestinian Society: Hamas
Contributes to Social Services in West Bank and Gaza, Hous. Chron., Sept. 28, 1997, at
32A.
387. Id.
38& See infra note 390.
389. Larry Kaplow, Hezbollah Turns to PR to Fight off Terroristic Inage, Atlanta
J.-Const., Mar. 4, 1999, at B1.
390. See Marjorie Miller, Hezbollah Battles to Sized Ertrernist Image in Lebanon,
L.A. Times, Nov. 28, 1997, at Al ("'Hezbollah has come of age.... They have gained
experience. They're systematic. They're good at management, and they don't waste
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Such a restriction impinges on a fundamental Islamic tenet requiring
2.5 percent of each Muslim's annual income to be given to charitable
organizations.391 While these organizations may have ties to groups
involved in paramilitary activity, they also do substantial communal
work. To prevent Arabs from donating money to any such
organization denies the reality that the Palestinian cause, or a
conservative Islamic movement, is a part of many Arabs' associative
ties. This effect, in itself, may stigmatize Arabs in their own eyes by
indicating the "inferiority" of their group.39  In the eyes of the
community, the stigma attaches itself not simply when one is found
guilty of contributing to a terrorist organization, but when one is
investigated or accused of being associated with a group being
investigated.393 This process contributes to the terrorist-image many
Americans have and the consequent stereotypes reinforced.394
3. Secret Evidence
As previously noted, secret evidence proceedings have not been
brought under AEDPA but instead under more lenient INS
regulations exploited in an accommodating political environment.395
The INS regulations give the government almost unfettered power as
the defendant cannot raise constitutional defenses, the prosecutor
need not even summarize classified evidence nor file criminal charges,
and one federal department manages the entire affair.396  A
disproportionate number of secret evidence cases are brought against
Arabs, which imposes harsh, constitutionally-suspect situations on
each person and his or her family. Arabs likely view themselves as
stigmatized members of society due to the focus and harshness of
treatment. The investigations alone reinforce terrorist suspicions and
the government's tactics suggest to society that a group is so
untrustworthy or dangerous that it is unworthy of basic constitutional
rights. Because Arabs are virtually the only group subject to such
treatment,397 they become unjustifiably perceived in the public
consciousness as terrorists.
time trying to make themselves popular with the usual propaganda."'). Another
newspaper observed that Palestinians were more dependent on Hamas-affiliated
charities than on the Palestinian Authority for support. Horan, supra note 386.
391. Horan, supra note 386.
392. Cf. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-94 (1954) (finding that
segregation of African American schoolchildren denotes to them that they are
inferior).
393. See Dempsey & Cole, supra note 6, at 11 (describing the "corroding effect"
law enforcement activity has on the ability of a community to integrate politically and
socially into American society).
394. See discussion supra Parts II.A, II.C.
395. See supra text accompanying notes 164-73.
396. See supra text accompanying note 168-73.
397. See Aschoff, Bail Is Granted, supra note 20.
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The numbers speak for themselves. Of approximately twenty-four
current secret evidence cases, almost all involve Muslims or Arabs.3"
For years different sources have reported that such selective
enforcement 39 infects the government's actions. Even two United
States Senators, Edward Kennedy and Spencer Abraham, ordered a
review of secret evidence cases and noted the "'disturbing' fact that
only Arab immigrants are jailed on secret evidence."'
A comparison of the situations of three former Irish terrorists
residing in the United States to that of a Palestinian, Mazen Al-Najjar,
suggests the racism, or politics reinforcing racism, behind the
application of secret evidence proceedings against immigrant
terrorists. Gabriel Megahey, an Irish immigrant living in the United
States, freely attended a 1997 immigration conference in Washington,
D.C., although he had previously served five years in a United States
prison for smuggling guns to the IRA in the 1980s." Noel Gaynor,
also living in the United States and attending the conference, had a
similar terrorist past, having been convicted as a lookout in the killing
of a police officer in Northern Ireland in the 1970s.Y The third
person, Malachy McAllister, has been in the United States since 1996
despite previously serving prison time in the United Kingdom, where,
in the 1980s, he stood guard while a partner shot a police officer and
later plotted to murder another one.'- An immigration judge has
ordered his deportation, but nothing in his story suggests that he has
ever been detained because of secret evidence.'
These three men were not simply accused terrorists; prosecutors
had met the burden of proof to convict them for their violent actions
supporting a terrorist group. Nonetheless, they freely resided in the
United States undisturbed by administrative proceedings that could
potentially incarcerate them based on secret evidence. In contrast,
from May 1997 through December 2000, Mazen AI-Najjar sat in jail
without being charged with anything. °5 Indeed, since convicted Irish
398. Id.
399. Akram, supra note 11, at 52 (stating in 1999 that secret evidence was a
"systematic attack" on a "very defined group": Arabs and Muslims); Aschoff, Politics
of Immigration, supra note 166 ("'If you look at the secret evidence cases across the
country... they're all against Arabs and Muslims."'); Cole, INS Terrorizes Arabs,
supra note 167 (reporting in 1998 that "all of the individuals involved [in secret
evidence cases] are Arabs, and most are Muslims"); Tebo, supra note 165, at 48
(reporting in 2000 that more than ninety percent of cases involve Arab Muslims).
400. Susan Aschoff, At Last Unveiled, Evidence Falls Short, Oct. 4, 1998, St.
Petersburg Times, at 1A [hereinafter Aschoff, At Last Unveiled].
401. See Aschoff, Politics of Inunigration. supra note 166.
402. See id.
403. See Dan Barry, Haunted by an Earlier Life: A Deportation Order Is Also a
Separation Order, N.Y. Times, Jan. 23,2001, at BI.
404. See id
405. See Susan Aschoff, Al-NaJjar Finally Out After 3 Years, St. Petersburg Times,
Dec. 16,2000, at 1A [hereinafter Aschoff, AI-Najjar Finally Out].
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terrorist Malachy McAllister took up his United States residence in
1996, at least nineteen Arab immigrants who were never charged,
much less convicted of anything, have been subject to government
efforts to detain them based on secret evidence.0 6
This disparity in treatment may be partially attributed to the
differences between the Irish-English and Arab-Israeli conflicts as
well as the United States' prioritization of each in its foreign policy. It
may also be understandable because the WTC bombing threatens
Americans more directly than any Irish terrorist activity. But consider
the extent of IRA violence: the group has killed over 1600 people
since 1969, and in 1998 an IRA splinter group killed twenty-nine
people.40 7 How much of the disparity in treatment is due to the
political strength of Irish political groups and the political weakness of
Arab or Muslim groups? 40 s And how much is that disparity in political
influence simply due to bias against Arabs? Susan Aschoff described
the political shifts one Congressman made between Arab and Irish
groups:
[D]elay [in designating "foreign terrorist organizations"] infuriated
Rep. Benjamin Gilman... who threatened to slash [State]
[D]epartment salaries until the list was produced. When it was
released, Gilman said the "administration is finally waking up to the
serious threat of foreign terrorist organizations."
Yet the same congressman six months earlier urged President
Clinton to permit [one Irish terrorist] to stay in the United States.
"His participation in a bombing of a police barracks in Northern
Ireland, for which he served his time.., was based on the nature of
the political situation at the time," Gilman wrote.
Legislators apply their labels with Post-It Note adhesive: One
violent attack is heinous terrorism, another a political act. A radical
group operating solely abroad is less evil than one also operating in
the United States. Followers of Islam are extremists, believers in
God are devout.40 9
United States history and the current treatment of Arabs suggest that
anti-Arab bias is certainly a factor in causing such contrasting
treatment. 410 Based in such bias, the use of secret evidence fosters the
public's perception of Arabs with suspicion and paranoia, sentiments
that consequently justify infringement of Arabs' basic fundamental
rights.
406. See supra note 167 (indicating nineteen secret evidence cases have been
brought since April 1996).
407. See James F. Clarity, Leverage and Folk Memory Keep I.R.A. Armed, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 26, 1998, at A3.
408. See Aschoff, Politics of Immigration, supra note 166 ("The Irish have powerful
friends in Congress; the Arabs have cautious acquaintances.").
409. Id. (second omission in original).
410. See discussion supra Parts I.B, II.C.
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A secret evidence proceeding also has tragic real-world
consequences for its target and family. The suspect must endure
incarceration without being able to refute an unknown accusation.
Spouses and children may see their parent, husband, or wife arrested
without knowing the reason and endure painful separation. The
conditions of detention are also no different than imprisonment."' A
secret evidence "detainee" lives with convicted criminals, receives the
same treatment from guards as other inmates, wears prison uniforms,
eats prison food, conforms to the same visitation rules, and showers
the permitted three times per week. n
Meanwhile, the lives of a detainee and his family must continue for
better or worse. Jobs may be lost. Families may break up. Arab
Americans may observe such constitutionally suspect treatment given
to a fellow Arab and sense the suspicion underlying its rationale. To
avoid such incarceration, the government may offer one option: stop
resisting deportation and find a new country in which to live.413 After
being identified as possible terrorists, however, they are "tainted
goods" who will not be accepted by other countries because of the
terrorist label.414 The stories of three separate secret evidence cases
illustrate the personal stigma and dehumanization that members of
the Arab community experience.4 5
In Florida, Mazen Al-Najjar, a Palestinian, was incarcerated from
May 1997 through December 2000,416 leaving behind three children
and his wife.417 He began living in the United States in 1981 and
obtained his Master's Degree from North Carolina Agricultural and
Technical State University in 1984.4"8 At the time of his detention, Al-
Najjar was the editor-in-chief for the research journal of a University
of South Florida think tank, the World and Islamic Studies Enterprise
("WISE"), devoted to encouraging dialogue about Middle East
issues.4 19 The INS alleged he was connected to the Palestinian Islamic
Jihad, which WISE was known to support, but Al-Najjar and his
411. See Tebo, supra note 165, at 44-45.
412. See id
413. Susan Aschoff, Immigrants All Packed with Nowhere to Go, St. Petersburg
Times, June 7,1999, at 1A [hereinafter Aschoff, Immigrants All Packed].
414. Id (describing the plight of Mazen AI-Najjar's family who obtained five visas
to Guyana only to have them rescinded when the government discovered the terrorist
accusations).
415. See generally, Dempsey & Cole, supra note 6, at 128-37, for a more detailed
discussion of the cases concerning Mazen AI-Najar, Hany Kiareldeen, and the Iraqi
cases, as well as Nasser Ahmed, Ali Khalil Termos, Imad Salin Hamad, Yahia
Meddah, and Anwar Haddam.
416. See supra text accompanying note 405. See generally Aschoff, Accused of
Being Suspicious, supra note 169 (recounting the secret evidence proceedings for
Mazen Al-Najjar).
417. Aschoff, Accused of Being Suspicious, supra note 169.
418. Najjar v. Reno, 97 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1332 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
419. Akram, supra note 11, at 76.
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attorney were not permitted to review the evidence purportedly
linking him.420 Instead, Al-Najjar received an unclassified summary
which merely stated: "This Court was provided with information as to
the association of [Al-Najjar] with the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. ''4 '
When a judge finally ordered Al-Najjar's release for lack of evidence,
the Justice Department further prolonged his incarceration by filing
three stays; AI-Najjar was released nine days later, after 1300 days of
imprisonment.422
In New Jersey, Hany Mahmoud Kiareldeen, also a Palestinian, was
imprisoned from March 199842 to October 1999.424 Kiareldeen had
been living in the United States since 1990, married an American
citizen in 1997, and had a daughter from a previous marriage.42 He
had been a manager in an electronics store.426  He was initially
detained for overstaying his student visa, and then the INS introduced
secret evidence to oppose his application for relief.427 Kiareldeen
received a one-page summary of the evidence against him alleging
that he was a member of an unnamed terrorist organization, he
associated with someone involved with the WTC bombing, and he had
threatened the Attorney General.42  One source, and perhaps the
only source, of claims against him appeared to be his estranged wife
who, several times before, had made allegations against him that were
dismissed as unfounded.429 Ultimately, the government never brought
criminal charges and the FBI closed its investigation in July 1999.43
Nevertheless, INS appeals and stays kept Kiareldeen imprisoned for
another three months, after already serving sixteen months, before his
eventual release.431
"The Iraqi Seven" came to the United States as part of a
government-assisted evacuation of six thousand Iraqi Kurds who had
participated in CIA efforts to overthrow Saddam Hussein. After
being brought to the United States, the government decided they were
security risks and detained them in California for two years based on
420. Najjar, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 1333.
421. Id. at 1333-34.
422. Aschoff, Al-Najjar Finally Out, supra note 405.
423. Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F. Supp. 2d 402, 404 (D.N.J. 1999).
424. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 2000 Report on Hate
Crimes & Discrimination Against Arab Americans (forthcoming 2001) (draft
manuscript at 36, on file with the Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter 2000 ADC
Report].
425. Kiareldeen, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 404.
426. Cole, INS Terrorizes Arabs, supra note 167.
427. Kiareldeen, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 404.
428. See Akram, supra note 11, at 77.
429. Dempsey & Cole, supra note 6, at 135.
430. Kiareldeen, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 405.
431. See id. at 404-05.
432. Akram, supra note 11, at 78.
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secret evidence.433 Such poor treatment of former allies compelled
James Woolsey, as an attorney and former CIA director, to become
involved in the case.4" While imprisoned, their families were resettled
so far away that they could not afford to visit 35 One man was
divorced by his wife during incarceration. 41 Another man missed the
first two years of his daughter's life while his wife depended on
welfare. 37 Evidence that came to light was uncorroborated, filled
merely with suspicion, and laced with anti-Arab comments.4 -' Five of
the men were ultimately able to join their families in Nebraska but
were subject to in-house confinement, telephone monitoring, and
permission for at-will government searches 39
B. Evidence that Arabs Have Been Stigmatized
AEDPA's enforcement against Arabs has entrenched society's
perception and treatment of them in conformity with their stereotype.
The resultant discrimination is evidenced in the policies of the Federal
Aviation Administration ("FAA"), the occurrence of hate crimes, and
the existence of general societal discrimination. The government, in
disproportionately subjecting Arabs to such harsh and stigmatic
treatment, has invited this discrimination and further stigmatization."
Such treatment, with "the sanction of law," marks the group as
inferior. 1 Not only does AEDPA's discrimination affect the self-
image of Arabs, 42 but it affects the perspective society as a whole has
of them. The terrorist stigma becomes the "basis" for how society
treats Arab people, retrospectively justifying the discriminatory
treatment by presuming that Arabs must deserve it. " Discrimination,
by society as a whole, is encouraged.'
The FAA has instituted procedures for profiling airline passengers,
a procedure which has invited criticism from the American-Arab
433. Aschoff, Immigrants All Packed, supra note 413.
434. See id; see also Aschoff, At Last Unveiled, supra note 400 (quoting Woolsey
emphatically contending, "[tihe whole idea that you can be imprisoned indefinitely
and sent back [to Iraq] to be tortured and killed on evidence you can't see... [is]
absolutely outrageous").
435. See Aschoff, Immigrants All Packed, supra note 413.
436. Id
437. Id.
438. See Aschoff, At Last Unveiled, supra note 400. One agent commented, -It's
been my experience working with these people that they lie, they lie an awful lot." Id.
Another wrote in his report: "There is no guilt in the Arab world. It's only shame."
Id
439. See Akram, supra note 11, at 78 n.168.
440. See Karst, Belonging to America, supra note 39, at 26.
441. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,494 (1954).
442. See supra text accompanying note 392.
443. See Karst, Belonging to America, supra note 39. at 26.
444. Cf Developments in the Law, supra note 342, at 1513 (contending that
discrimination by the police stigmatizes the subject group as people "less worthy of
equal respect").
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Anti-Discrimination Committee ("ADC") and other civil rights
groups."5 The resulting discrimination has been called "Flying While
Arab."'4" 6 Passengers have heard the announcement, "All Arabic-
speaking passengers step to the side."" 7 In the sixteen months after
the unexplained 1996 crash of TWA flight 800, the ADC reported
over two hundred complaints of airline profiling, "more than at
anytime since the Gulf War."" 8  Furthermore, in response to the
crash, a White House commission recommended precautionary
measures against international terrorists even though a cause for the
disaster had not yet been determined and has since been attributed to
a combustible fuel tank ignited by an electrical surge." 9
One particular recommendation, a passenger profiling system, was
instituted in January 1998 after being abandoned for more than
twenty years.450 Arabs had reason to be concerned because they were
already being subject to airport discrimination.41  Their fears were
thereafter justified by the "hundreds" of reports of discrimination
submitted by Arab travelers.452 The ADC has concluded that profiling
"is systematic and very widespread. 453
The ADC lists a multitude of airport profiling complaints. The
following are a mere sampling. In 1996 at Newark Airport, a
Palestinian American woman was subjected to a fifty minute
interrogation after describing her name as Arab in response to a
question from the ticketing agent.454 In 1997 at a Tampa airport, an
Arab mother and son were questioned and had all their luggage
searched by airport security in front of all other passengers before
boarding their flight.455 In July 1999 at a Chicago airport, a man had
answered all routine ticket counter questions when, after smelling
something unusual, the ticket counter claimed she heard him say he
had a bomb, whereupon he was arrested by the police even though
445. See Michael Higgins, Looking the Part: With Criminal Profiles Being Used
More Widely to Spot Possible Terrorists and Drug Couriers, Claims of Bias Are Also
on the Rise, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1997, at 48,49-50.
446. Ronald Fernandez, Editorial, Not Quite White; Facing Negative Stereotypes,
Post- World War 11 Wave of Immigrants Have United Under 'Arab American' Banner,
Hartford Courant, Sept. 1, 2000, available at LEXIS, News, The Hartford Courant.
447. Higgins, supra note 445, at 50.
448. Id.
449. See Angie Cannon, FBI, Cops Targeting Domestic Terrorism; Oklahoma City
Raised Awareness, Times-Picayune (New Orleans), Mar. 30, 1997, at Al; Laurence
Zuckerman, Board Approves Final Report on Crash of T.W.A. Flight 800, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 24, 2000, at B6.
450. See 2000 ADC Report, supra note 424, at 22-23.
451. See supra text accompanying note 448.
452. See 2000 ADC Report, supra note 424, at 23-24.
453. Id.
454. 1996-97 ADC Report, supra note 167, at 20.
455. Id. at 24. In fact, they again had their bags searched by security in the
boarding area. Id.
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they did not find anything in his bag' 5  In November 1999 at a
Columbus airport, two Arab doctoral students were met upon landing
by local police, FBI agents, and bomb-sniffing dogs and detained for
eight hours after they had asked "suspicious questions" at their
departure point about when the plane arrived and whether it was
full. 457
The ADC recorded over twenty hate crimes in 1996 and 1997, a
figure it believes to be a "severe undercount. 45  The following
incidents from around the United States provide a sampling of the
bias to which Arabs were subject during that period. In Virginia, a
teenager was verbally and physically assaulted by a 32-year old
Caucasian male who called him and his father numerous racial
epithets including "dirty Arab.45 9 In California, an arsonist burned
down a newly-constructed Arab American mosque.' In North
Carolina, a 13-year old died due to a gunshot wound from an attacker
who had previously been making racial comments against the
deceased.46 In New York, an immigrant was killed in a tenant dispute
by his landlord, who had allegedly stated a hatred for immigrants.'
In Maryland, an Arab American woman activist, in the fifth hate
crime against her in three years, had her two family cars slashed and
broken into, and swastikas scratched into them.41'
More hate crimes have arisen since 1999 according to a preliminary
ADC report. In Colorado, the bombing of an Islamic center was
averted after police chased the plotter and found him with bomb
components, guns, machetes, and ammunition.' The suspect claimed
to be "an enemy" of Islam who wanted to "kill Iraqis."''- In Illinois,
someone threw a large piece of concrete into the glass front door of a
mosque. 6 In Tennessee, a Muslim worshipper was shot by a gunman,
who had a history of taunting neighborhood worshippers, and was
chased into his mosque, where the gunman attempted to shoot into its
456. 2000 ADC Report, supra note 424, at 26.
457. Id at 28 (internal quotes omitted).
458. See 1996-97 ADC Report, supra note 167, at 6. The ADC is the only
organization in the United States that collects data concerning discrimination and
hate crimes against Arab Americans. Id. The Justice Department compiles hate
crime statistics, but the ADC reported as of 1997 that their categories do not include
anti-Arab acts. Id. at 5. The FBI's 1999 Uniform Crime Report indicates that the FBI
has yet to expand their categorization. See FBI, Uniform Crime Reports: Crime in the
United States-1999, 59, available at http'vlwww.fbi.govlucr/99cius.htm (last visited
Jan. 7,2001) [hereinafter 1999 FBI Crime Report].
459. 1996-97 ADC Report, supra note 167, at 6.
460. Id. at 7.
461. Id.
462. Id. at 8.
463. Id. at 9.
464. 2000 ADC Report, supra note 424, at 5-6.
465. Id
466. Id. at 6.
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locked door.4 67 Hate has also manifested itself in the cyber world,
where people have received hateful e-mails. One message stated that
"history repeatedly has proved [sic] that if Arabs get a chance they
will be the most evil creatures walking on this planet."4" Another e-
mail accused its recipient, "[y]ou encourage your youth to die so that
you can publish their deaths in world newspaper [sic] in the hope of
gaining world sympathy. How sick and misled you are. 4 69
Discrimination also exists in the workplace and everyday activities
for Arabs. In 1996 and 1997, the ADC received numerous complaints.
In Boston, a dispatcher was called such ethnic slurs as "sand nigger,"
"Achmed," and "camel jockey," by co-workers and his supervisor.470
In Detroit, an employee sued his company, alleging that he was
denied promotions due to his ethnicity; the company ultimately
settled out of court with him.47 In San Francisco, an airline employee
won a lawsuit charging his employer with giving discriminatory work
assignments and subjecting him to workplace hostility due to his
Jordanian origins.472 In Virginia, a real estate agent allegedly refused
rental property to an Arab American couple.473 In Massachusetts, two
men attempting to rent from a truck rental center allegedly had a
manager yell at them, after they complained about harassing
treatment: "What are you going to do? Blow up the store like you
did to the Oklahoma Building? 474
The ADC's current draft 2000 report provides a list of more such
discrimination after 1997. In particular, they record approximately
twenty-five incidents of workplace discrimination per week.4 75 The
following two cases typify the hostile and degrading conditions to
which Arab employees are often subject. In Virginia, a woman server
was degraded by comments calling her "camel jockey" and "bitch"
and Arab customers "cheap. ' 476 Although the hostile environment
forced her to leave, the employer later issued an apology and asked
for her return.477 In Michigan, employees obtained a settlement with
Detroit Edison after charging the company with discriminatory hiring
and promotion.478
Each of these forms of discrimination are deemed acceptable in
large part by American society. Discrimination against perceived
467. Id. at 7.
468. Id. at 9.
469. Id. at 11.
470. 1996-97 ADC Report, supra note 167, at 11-12.
471. Id. at 13.
472. Id. at 14.
473. Id. at 17.
474. Id.
475. 2000 ADC Report, supra note 424, at 13.
476. Id. at 17.
477. Id. at 17-18.
478. Id. at 20.
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"terrorists" is acceptable. Yet, in reality, such discrimination is one
more example of racism and prejudice in America-the same
impulses that subjected African Americans to slavery, Chinese to
exclusion, and Japanese Americans to internment." 9 In each case, the
American government has cited a "necessity" for such
discrimination-African Americans were needed as slave labor for
the nation's southern economy, the Chinese were inferior and
criminal people, and Japanese Americans were a threat to national
security.' There will always be excuses to discriminate against a
certain class of people. But to fully realize the American concept of
equal justice requires equal justice for all of its people.
C. Bringing Equal Justice to Arabs in America
1. Proposed Solutions
To eliminate the unequal justice AEDPA has brought to Arabs,
this Note makes three recommendations. First, and most importantly,
antiterrorism legislation should be revised to include domestic
terrorist groups, not just those which are international. By doing so,
Arabs will have a less exaggerated presence on the government's list
of terrorist organizations,"' thus removing the unwarranted stigma of
the "terrorist" label. Society will be less apt to mostly associate them
with terrorism when other domestic groups are identified as terrorist
organizations as well. Furthermore, the legislation should clearly and
publicly establish the standard for making the terrorist list and
provide explanation as to why certain groups qualify. The
government's current definitions for either a terrorist activity or
organization are "vague and subject to political manipulation."
This measure is not merely necessary because of AEDPA's
discriminatory treatment of Arabs, but because such treatment is
completely unjustified. While the historical trend of overseas
terrorism by Arab groups"- is the most compelling argument for
focusing antiterrorist protections at Arab groups, the thrust of
domestic antiterrorism measures in the wake of Oklahoma City
should have been directed at the domestic threats that had actually
manifested themselves on American soil before contemplating and
countering international threats that might arise here. The
government may rely on classified information as support for
AEDPA's international focus, but to accept such justification would,
in effect, grant the sort of unfettered discretion internment during
479. See discussion supra Part I.B.
480. See supra text accompanying notes 66-68,76-77, 94-102.
481. See supra text accompanying note 21.
482. Akram, supra note 11, at 71 n.113.
483. See supra text accompanying notes 138, 224.
2001] 2883
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
World War II illustrated to be vulnerable to constitutional abuse.
Furthermore, part of Arab Americans' problems is that society has so
readily associated their community with a terrorist threat here despite
very few domestic incidents of Arab terrorism. Classified information
showing more Arab terrorist activity would not alter the conclusion
that based on what society does know, it has unjustly treated Arabs.
The attendant problem of reviving aggressive Hoover-era FBI
investigations into domestic groups484 may be prevented by affording
full constitutional protection to any groups on the list, as they operate
within the United States. The new antiterrorism measures should
further guarantee such protection to individual members who reside
in the United States, regardless of their citizenship. An Arab in
America who is allegedly a member of the terrorist group Hamas, a
group trying to influence America's Palestinian policy, should not be
at a greater disadvantage than a Caucasian American in The New
Order,485 a group seeking to affect social policy.
This approach would also prevent the exaggerated labeling of
terrorist sources that the WTC-related investigations may have
induced.486  The government may have broader flexibility to
investigate groups while they are overseas, but domestic investigations
should not subject residents to potential systemic disadvantages
resulting from unconscious racism manifested in prosecutors'
discretion. 41 Any person in the United States would thereby have full
protection under the Constitution, ensuring that the "terrorist" label
is applied equally on the merits, and not affected by prejudice.
Second, the government should track hate crimes against Arabs.
The FBI's current record, the Uniform Crime Report on Hate Crimes,
recognizes anti-Muslim attacks but not those which are anti-Arab. 88
Such a corrective measure would be appropriate because the
government has been complicit in stigmatizing Arabs. Society should
know that Arab people are a group whose full participation in society
is as fully protected as other groups currently tracked.489
Finally, Congress ought to reconsider a recently proposed bill and a
long-standing petition which specifically address problems initiated
484. See David M. Park, Re-Examining the Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI
Investigations of Domestic Groups, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 769, 771 (1997); The FBI, supra
note 2, at 195. During the mid-1970s, the Senate's Church Committee discovered that
the FBI under Director J. Edgar Hoover had been monitoring all major protest
groups with wiretaps, bugs, informants, and break-ins. See Dempsey & Cole, supra
note 6, at 6.
485. See supra text accompanying note 284.
486. See supra text accompanying notes 338-39.
487. See supra text accompanying notes 340-43.
488. See supra note 458.
489. The hate crimes currently tracked are "Anti-White," "Anti-Black," "Anti-
American Indian/Alaskan Native," "Anti-Asian/Pacific Islander," and "Anti-Multi-
Racial Group." 1999 FBI Crime Report, supra note 458, at 59. The report also tracks
hate crimes against Hispanics in a separate section. Id.
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by AEDPA. The Secret Evidence Repeal Act, sponsored by
Representative David E. Bonior, addresses perhaps AEDPA's most
egregious feature. 9 The bill recognizes the unconstitutionality of
secret evidence and repeals its use in the bond hearings commonly
used against Arabs as well as other proceedings. 91 By enacting this
bill the nation may prevent the resultant debilitation and
stigmatization of such proceedings. A petition, Law Professors'
Petition to Congress, addresses the broader concern of AEDPA's
chilling effect on the social and political activity of Arab Americans!'
Signed by over five hundred law professors at almost 150 schools, the
signers call on Congress to "enact legislation that will prevent the FBI
and other federal law enforcement agencies from undertaking
investigations that threaten the exercise of First Amendment
rights. '493 By limiting investigative powers, the public branding that
Arab groups are subject to without evidence to support criminal
charges would be reduced.
2. Why America Must Reestablish Equal Justice
Arabs in America have many obvious reasons to demand equal
justice. By removing the unwarranted terrorist stigma, they become
less of a disfavored group subject to hate crimes and everyday
discrimination. Freed of such obstacles, each Arab person will be
enabled to fulfill his individual potential and attain his optimal
position in society.494  More fundamental to the American
constitutional system, Arabs will be more fully able to politically
participate when the stigma is removed. 9" Unlike other immigrant
groups, Arabs, often mistakenly perceived as Muslims, have
encountered an "extraordinary roadblock" in their efforts to have
"mainstream influence." '4 96 Their impediment has been attributed to
their perceived religious connections to the Middle Eastl and
therefore the terrorism often related to the region.
The 2000 New York campaign for United States Senator between
Senator Hillary Clinton and former Representative Rick Lazio
illustrated Arabs' current disability. Lazio, based on an erroneous
newspaper report, zealously attacked Clinton for accepting a $50,000
donation from the American Muslim Alliance; he called the
490. Secret Evidence Repeal Act of 2000, H.R. 2121, 106th Cong. (2000), available
at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/cl06query.html.
491. See i §§ 2(1), 4-6.
492- See Dempsey & Cole, supra note 6, at 163.
493. 1l
494. See supra text accompanying notes 54-58.
495. See supra text accompanying notes 59-63.
496. Dean E. Murphy, For Muslim Americans, Influence In Politics Still Hard to
Come By, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 2000, at Al [hereinafter Murphy, For Muslim
Americans].
497. ld.
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contribution "blood money" because the group allegedly advocated
armed force in supporting Palestinian rights. 98 Clinton validated
Lazio's attack by renouncing the contribution, 99 without apparently
discovering the accusation's falsity or defending the group, thereby
perpetuating the stigmatization of Arabs. An Alliance member
described the episode in all-too-familiar terms: "Muslim Americans
and Arab-Americans are being muddied and universally associated
with acts of terrorism."5 °0
The Arab sense that they are stigmatized in American politics is not
a new revelation. In 1997, one activist commented: "If a Sen[ator]
Kennedy goes and talks on the Irish, there is very little opposition.
The minute (a congressman) does something about Arabs, he's going
to find 10 other senators immediately on his back."'5 1 By eliminating
the unjustified terrorism label that has cast them as disloyal and
debilitated their political participation, Arabs may achieve their
rightful influence in politics and society.
By upholding "equal justice," society also prevents the distortions
which can hinder our constitutional system.sr 2  Decisions and
compromises must be based upon genuine overlapping interests, not
prevented or infected by irrational prejudices.0 3 Thus, in adhering to
equal justice, the democratic processes function efficiently and
properly, and we prevent the "instability, injustice, and confusion"
that James Madison warned were "mortal diseases" to our society."
Not only do we prevent the collapse of our constitutional framework,
however, we ensure its just and equal functioning. Policies and
legislation will be directed at the genuine source of a problem as
revealed through rational deliberation, not the scapegoat unearthed
by irrational and distorted prejudice.
Such benefits apply to society's treatment of every ethnic group. In
an America seeking to maintain preeminence in a globalizing world
and heading toward a point where Caucasians will be a minority in the
nation (and already are a minority in California), the principle of
498. See Anthony York, Muslim Group May Endorse Hillary Clinton: The
Campaign Says It Would Not Accept the Support of the American Muslim Alliance.
Salon.com, Nov. 2, 2000, at http:lwww.salon.com/politics/featurel2000/ll/O2Iamal
print.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2000); Eric Boehlert, Hillary's Middle East Crisis: The
New York Daily News Breaks A Big Story About Controversial Arab Donations to
Clinton That Everyone-Including the Daily News-Later Gets Wrong, Salon.com,
Nov. 3, 2000, at http:lwww.salon.comlpoliticslfeature/2000/11/02/news/print.html (last
visited Nov. 2, 2000).
499. York, supra note 498.
500. Id.
501. Aschoff, Politics of Immigration, supra note 166 (quoting Sami AI-Arian, the
brother-in-law of a secret evidence detainee).
502. Supra text accompanying notes 59-63.
503. Supra text accompanying notes 61-62.
504. The Federalist No. 10, at 45 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
505. See Michael Lind, The Beige and The Black, N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1998, at 38
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equal justice must be guaranteed for everyone. The fact pattern that
led to AEDPA and its application against Arabs may be repeated
against others. For example, will future campaign finance reform fully
address the problem or focus on Asian Americans who were tarnished
in the Clinton fundraising scandals?-" Does America's current war
against drugs actually attack the epidemic or simply Hispanic and
African Americans?
In the end, however, equal justice is a principle that promises the
attainment of positive results, not merely the avoidance of negative
ones. Along with the immediate benefits that accrue to Arabs who
become unshackled from the terrorist stigma, society stands to unlock
tremendous untapped potential and realize uncontemplated
advantages. The ability of Arabs to maximize their talents ensures
their greater contribution to society, in turn providing a richer pool of
talent for developing future doctors, politicians, business people,
scientists, and every other occupation. In foreign relations, society
stands to gain a unique "window into Islam"5'1 helping to ensure
policy is not "based on selfish interests, bias, or domestic political
concerns [which] may unnecessarily make us a target for the wrath of
others.""St 8 Against terrorism, equal justice will ensure that we
genuinely act toward preventing terrorist activity by all groups and
not just society's scapegoat, thereby providing effective protection for
society, not the patchwork defensive measures AEDPA represents.
A nation upholding equal justice and preventing the stigmatization
of ethnic groups and their members is predestined for cultural and
societal enrichment. In such a society, Tseming Yang described,
"[b]oth religious and racial minority groups can serve as incubators
for views that are different and contribute to the robust exchange of
ideas in a democracy. Cultural pluralism thus contributes to the
cultural diversity and richness of the mainstream culture that can
strengthen our system of democracy."'" 9° By eliminating the unequal
justice of AEDPA, we begin realizing such a vibrant future for Arab
Americans, for minority groups of all backgrounds, and for the nation
itself.
(describing U.S. Census Bureau projections predicting the proportion of Caucasians
will decrease to merely 52.7 percent of the population in 2050); Todd S. Purdum,
Non-Hispanic Whites a Minority, California Census Figures Show, N.Y. Times, Mar.
30,2001, at Al.
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CONCLUSION
As a nation expressly dedicated to equality and constantly
replenished by new immigrants and their cultures, future American
society is unavoidably and undeniably affected by how it cultivates the
resources of its present populace. We will achieve less than our
collective potential if we inhibit certain groups' ability to maximize
their group potential. Arabs in America currently strive to live and
succeed in a society that unjustly perceives them as terrorists and
subjects them almost exclusively to constitutionally-suspect legislation
in the form of AEDPA, which responds to and perpetuates that fear.
For the benefit of Arabs and for the overall good of the nation,
Congress should rectify the injustice AEDPA has wrought and
guarantee "equal justice" for the Arab community and for all people.
